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ABSTRACT
I study information asymmetries in loan underwriting. In the first chapter, I develop a
model of how loan officers interpret and use soft information in making decisions about the
size of loans they give to applicants. The model emphasizes loan officer heterogeneity in
risk preferences, ability, and beliefs about ability. I recover estimates of these loan officer
characteristics using data on the joint distribution of loan decisions and outcomes. I find
that loan officers differ across all three dimensions of heterogeneity, but that they are able to
generate higher profits for the lender than would a mechanistic decision process that would
solely utilize hard information. In the second chapter, I estimate the effect of moral hazard
on loan default. I account for potential endogeneity by exploiting a natural experiment
where borrower applications are randomly assigned as an instrument for loan sizes. I find
that borrowers become more likely to default in response to larger loans, but the lender
may be able to attenuate this additional risk with increased collection intensity on larger
loans. In the third chapter, I examine peer effects arising from a coworker’s default on the
probability that a borrower will be late on loan payments. I rely on rich data detailing
coworker relationships and time-varying fixed effects to control for correlated unobservables
and endogenous group formation. I find that borrowers are more likely to be late with their
payment when they have coworkers who default.
xi
CHAPTER I
Why hire loan officers? Examining delegated expertise
1.1 Introduction
Many organizations such as universities, investment funds, and banks employ experts to
screen uncodified subjective data that would otherwise be difficult to process. For exam-
ple, admission counselors can read essays, fund managers can listen to conference calls, and
loan officers can conduct interviews. However, this ability to interpret subjective informa-
tion is costly. These agents require pecuniary compensation and also may have their own
characteristics such as risk preferences or other biases that could distort their decisions.
These characteristics could also create incentive conflicts that lead the agent to take actions
different than the ones preferred by the principal.
I examine these issues using data from a Chinese lender that delegates loan decisions to expert
loan officers. The lender specializes in unsecured loans to households and small businesses,
and the lender hires loan officers to screen borrowers and to choose an approved loan amount.
I am able to quantify the value of subjective screening by developing a structural model of
how loan officers behave. The model features rich agent heterogeneity including differences in
risk preferences, screening ability, and allows loan officers to have heterogeneous beliefs about
1
said ability. Using the model primitives, I calculate their value to the lender by comparing
their loan decisions to an econometrician’s predictions. Despite the many advantages afforded
to the econometrician, I find that loan officers still outperform the econometrician by more
than three times their pay.
These issues have important implications for the design of incentive schemes in principal
agent relationships particularly in cases where information must be acquired and acted
upon. Understanding the potential costs that result from idiosyncratic differences across
agents could lead to interventions that mitigate the distortions inherent in subjective eval-
uation. In addition, by formally modeling the agent’s decisions, it is possible to consider
interactions. For example, an agent’s risk preferences may attenuate some of the distor-
tions due to heterogeneous beliefs. Moreover, as organizations increasingly rely on different
methodologies to evaluate risks, it is important to develop a framework that allows for coun-
terfactual comparisons between alternatives. Ultimately, the magnitude of the costs and
the net benefit of subjective screening is an open empirical question. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first empirical study examining screening using a structural model.
Lending is a particularly interesting setting to study these issues for a number of reasons.
First, in contrast to university admissions, the costs and benefits to the lender can be ob-
jectively quantified using loan profit and salary data. Second, agency costs that distort
loan decisions have important negative effects on borrowers as well as lenders. For exam-
ple, Banerjee and Newman (1993) find that a lack of credit could lead to poverty traps for
borrowers, while Fan et al. (2013) and Nanda (2008) show that financial constraints for com-
mercial lending also negatively impact firm entry, profit, and survival.1 And third, lenders
1Karlan and Zinman (2010) and Morduch (1998) also find negative impacts on job retention, income, and
mental outlook from insufficient credit. However, the welfare effects are more ambiguous when examining
certain kinds of high APR loans in developed countries. For example, Melzer (2011) finds that use of US
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have a clear alternative to subjective evaluation. Since the 1980’s, lending markets worldwide
have undergone drastic transformations from interview-based to risk-based pricing Johnson
(2004). Today, while manual evaluation is still used in home mortgages Tzioumis and Gee
(2013), business financing Agarwal and Ben-David (2014), and consumer loans Karlan and
Zinman (2009), some financial products such as revolving credit exclusively use automated
credit scoring for decisions. As a result, algorithmic lending provides a natural benchmark
against which to assess the value of subjective evaluation.
Answering these questions requires overcoming a number of obstacles and places formidable
demands on data. For example, developing a counterfactual lending model requires recover-
ing the borrower’s repayment function, which itself is an important object of study. Because
many loan decisions are decided with information generally unobserved to the econome-
trician, an omitted variables problem exists when estimating the repayment function. In
particular, the marginal effect of loan size on repayment may be an endogenous object. To
account for this, a literature has developed that focuses exclusively on exploring exogenous
changes in loan terms to solve this causal inference problem (Karlan and Zinman 2009;
Dobbie and Skiba 2013).
Furthermore, identifying differences across loan officers requires quasi-experimental variation
to ensure similar ex-ante unobserved borrower attributes. Fortunately, the random assign-
ment of borrower applications to loan officers overcomes both of these inference challenges.
The random assignment of caseloads has been exploited by Abrams et al. (2012) to analyze
prejudicial differences across justices in racial sentencing disparities, and used by Maestas
et al. (2013) to instrument for disability benefits to identify impacts on employment. This
study jointly explores both the differences across evaluators and uses those differences as an
payday lending leads to increased difficulty in repaying household bills.
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instrument in identifying a causal effect.
The differences across loan officers is modeled with rich heterogeneity. Loan officers are
described by their risk preferences, screening ability, and beliefs about their screening abil-
ity. Some loan officers may even have inconsistent beliefs about their ability. This flexible
specification nests overconfidence, underconfidence, and rational expectations that can be
tested using model restrictions. The borrower’s stochastic risk level is determined by both
screenable and unscreenable factors in contrast to studies that do not distinguish between
the two. Loan officers screen applications and develop posterior beliefs about the borrower’s
likelihood of repayment conditional on a signal the loan officer observes about the borrower.
Given this updated belief and the compensation scheme, loan officers choose the size of the
loan to approve to maximize their expected utility from lending.
The empirical strategy relies on rich data from a large Chinese lender. This dataset offers
an ideal setting to study these issues for a number of reasons. The data features detail at
the individual borrower level including all of the codified application variables available to
the lender. The exhaustive set of data allows me to construct an econometrician’s prediction
using the same information set that the lender would have had access to in the absence of
loan officers. Observed borrower attributes include the approved loan amount, loan terms,
demographics, education, financial, credit reports, self-reported survey data, and also include
home and workplace inspection variables totaling over 250 covariates. I also observe the full
monthly repayment stream including monthly payments, delinquencies, and penalty fees.
By incorporating late fees, I am able to construct a more comprehensive measure of loan
profitability.
The structural model is able to attribute the differences in loan sizes and loan profits across
loan officers to their idiosyncratic characteristics. Specifically, I develop a maximum like-
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lihood estimator that models the joint distribution of loan sizes and loan profits. All else
being equal, loan officers that are more risk averse approve smaller loan sizes. Loan offi-
cers exhibiting greater overconfidence approve loans with greater variation conditional on
codified borrower attributes. And all else equal, loan officers with greater screening ability
have better performing loan portfolios. The borrower repayment function is also recovered
endogenously from the model. Using the model primitives, I construct different counterfac-
tual lending scenarios including the econometrician’s prediction. By comparing to the status
quo, I can use these counterfactuals to measure the net value of subjective screening to the
lender.
I preview three main results. First, there is substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences,
screening ability, and beliefs across loan officers. I further find that all of the loan officers
exhibit overconfidence where their loan decisions implies screening abilities that are much
more accurate than that shown by the data. These idiosyncratic differences across loan
officers lead to large effects on loan sizes and profits. Second, these differences distort loan
decisions and impose costs for the lender. Estimates suggest that the lender would be
willing to pay ¥100 to ¥400 per loan to mitigate their costs. For perspective, this is roughly
equivalent to the per loan salary of an additional two to seven loan officers. Third, despite
these costs, the average loan officer is able to outperform an econometrician’s predictions by
more than three times her average pay. Given the many advantages of the econometrician,
this suggests that loan officers would have also outperformed other econometric models
developed by the lender at the time of origination.
This study sits at the intersection of a number of different literatures. The results provide
an empirical basis for models of delegated expertise. These are a form of principal agent
models that focuses on agents who are tasked with collecting, interpreting, and acting upon
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information. Frequently applied to portfolio managers screening risky assets, the framework
features both information acquisition and an investment decision. With these two actions,
the agents are largely able to control both the scale and variance of their output, which
is generally not the case in the standard principal agent model (see Stracca 2006 for a
survey). While most of the research in this area has considered the optimum incentive
contract (Demski and Sappington 1987; Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer 1985; Stoughton 1993),
this is the first structural application of this framework.2
Loan officer screening behavior has also been considered before, generally in the context of
randomized control trials or field experiments. Agarwal and Ben-David (2014), Cole et al.
(2013), and Paravisini and Schoar (2013) test comparative statics about changes in the their
compensation structure or information sets. They find that loan officers respond on multiple
margins including the permissiveness, profitability, and volume of new loans. I contribute
by casting their results into a model of how loan officers behave that can also be used for
counterfactual analysis. Furthermore, I’m able to be very precise about modeling the differ-
ences between screenable risk and unscreenable risk. Unscreenable risk may be unpredictable
shocks to repayment from business cycles to accidents. Ignoring this distinction may falsely
inflate the value of loan screening.
I want to differentiate this study from others that focused on examining the effectiveness
of automated credit scoring compared to loan officers. Einav et al. (2013b) and Edelberg
(2006) provide compelling evidence that credit scoring outperforms loan officers in isolation.
The popularity of risk-based pricing across virtually all channels of retail credit attest to the
effectiveness of automated methods to price codified risk. The comparison considered here
2Misra and Nair (2011) and Paarsch and Shearer (2009) estimate structural models of behavior in the
broader principal agent literature. Their research is also largely concerned with the effort policy function
and not with additional forms of heterogeneity such as overconfidence.
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is not to eliminate the machines, but to examine the additional value of experts working in
conjunction with these machines.3
This study will also find evidence of inconsistent beliefs across loan officers indicating that
many may be overconfident in their abilities. Other authors have also tried to find evidence
of overconfidence, and their approach generally involves presupposing its existence and then
testing model predictions that result. For example, Barber and Odean (2001) and Mal-
mendier and Tate (2004) pre-classify agents as overconfident and then attribute differences
in behavior to that assumption.4 My approach to identifying inconsistent beliefs is similar
to a lab study. I am able to directly tie the loan officer’s rating of a borrower’s perceived risk
to the borrower’s actual risk using loan outcome data. Screening ability and beliefs about
said ability is identified jointly from the distribution of loan sizes and loan performance. In
addition, I can explicitly incorporate the interaction between overconfidence and risk pref-
erences. Goel and Thakor (2008) find that models that do not separately account for risk
attitudes and overconfidence may confound identification of both.
The remaining sections are structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and context in
more detail. Section 3 develops the structural model of the loan officer’s behavior. Section
4 presents the empirical strategy and intuition for identification of the model parameters.
Section 5 uses the structural primitives of the loan officer and the borrower’s repayment
function to evaluate counterfactual scenarios. Section 6 concludes.
3This also relates to a class of papers that uses counterfactual scenarios developed from structural models
to make normative policy suggestions. For example, Cho and Rust (2008) and Mantrala et al. (2006) focus
on optimal pricing strategies for an auto retailer.
4Another strategy explains certain market equilibrium as the optimal response to overconfident consumers.
Grubb (2009) finds that overconfidence may explain some types of non-linear price schedules used by telecoms.
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1.2 Environment
I study a large Chinese lender with more than 40 sales branches located across the coun-
try. One of the lender’s main products is unsecured cash loans to households and small
businesses.5 Average loan sizes are significantly higher than the microloans studied in the
development literature and are slightly less than half of the average borrower’s annual salary
income. Self-reported loan purposes range from weddings to home appliances to restaurant
furnishings and office supplies. The borrowing population is not financially at-risk or sub-
prime, and they have access to other financing options such as credit cards, home and vehicle
loans, and other cash-based lenders.6 The credit card market in China is characterized by
low rates of merchant take-up and high transaction fees. As a result, there has been a large
growth in popularity of cash-based lending in China. See Ayyagari et al. (2010) for a more
detailed survey of the Chinese financing industry.
1.2.1 Data
Table (1.1) presents some summary statistics for the data. The data period covers all loans
made from December 2011 to January 2014 and includes 31,954 borrowers with application
and repayment data. Because some loans have not yet completed, the repayment data is
censored for about 22,000 borrowers. I discuss methods to accommodate data censoring
5In many parts of the developing world including China, the formal differences between small businesses
and households are small. Morduch (1998) finds that small business loans are often used for consumption
smoothing as well as investment purchases. The lender’s underwriting procedures between the two segments
is similar. Lending to state owned enterprises and large firms is primarily handled by traditional banks.
6Broecker (1990) finds that competition among different lenders could decrease the average credit-
worthiness of a lender’s portfolio through adverse selection. In this environment, this concern is somewhat
alleviated by credit agency reporting. Some of the reported information include credit applications, external
loan terms, and historical repayment.
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in the empirical section. Average loan sizes are about ¥33,450, which is roughly $5,400 at
current exchange rates. These loan amounts are substantial both in absolute terms and as
a proportion of the average salary income of ¥71,000.7
Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Mean Min Max Std dev
Loan terms
Loan amount (¥000’s) 33 5 60 12
Requested (¥000’s) 124 3 300 103
Monthly payment (¥000’s) 2.2 0.3 5.7 1.1
Payment length (Months) 25 12 36 7
APR (%) 48% 33% 62% 7%
Borrower attributes
Estimated assets (¥000’s) 587 1 7,358 1,337
Salary income (¥000’s) 71 4 642 267
External debt (¥000’s) 160 0 1,923 856
Age 38 18 58 9
Credit card utilization 41% 0% 100% 38%
Credit card limit (¥000’s) 20 0 718 156
Proportion with credit card 76%
Proportion female 28%
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan
amount with a set APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the
loan officers. APR is inclusive of application fees. Financial variables are from verified credit
reports. Estimated assets include non-payroll sources, social security payments, vehicle and
other durable goods as well as business income. Debt is the sum of the external debt load
including credit, housing, and auto loans as identified by a credit report. As of August 2014,
$1 is ¥6.18.
Each loan is advertised with an APR and payment length, and different products are offered
across locations based on the local competitive landscape. New products are introduced and
retired frequently at each of the various locations. Loan term lengths range from 12 to 36
months with the median at 24 months. The most common loan in my sample is a 24-month
7Beyond direct deposited salary income, the lender counts many sources of additional income such as non-
deposited salary, social security payments, business income, housing assistance, tax payments, and others.
Detailed asset information such as housing, vehicles, and insurance policies are also collected to estimate
net worth. There is also separate income accounting for certain worker types such as specialized employees
or government workers whose primary compensation may be through reimbursement and payment in kind.
The result is that individuals with low amounts of stated payroll may still be approved for large loans. For
comparison, per capita GDP in Shanghai is ¥82,000, and is ¥38,000 for China as a whole.
9
fixed payment loan with an APR of 48%. This APR includes the nominal interest rate,
application fees, and other ancillary maintenance fees.8
1.2.2 Loan process
The borrower’s first step is to fill out a loan application which includes identification, de-
mographics, financial documents, and verified references. The borrower records the loan
amount requested as well as the purpose of the loan. Following the application, local branch
employees verify the borrower’s income, debt, and asset information using bank statements
and credit reporting. The branch employees will also make home and workplace inspections
to assess the borrower’s home environment. Data is collected on the number of TV sets,
air conditioning units, square footage, and others which are photographed. One purpose
of these somewhat unorthodox inspections is to find evidence of identity fraud or potential
flight risk.
The local branch employees collect a large amount of hard and soft information. I follow
Petersen (2004) in defining hard information as quantitative, codified, and with no ambiguity
in interpretation. Because the information is codified, the information can be inputted into
a credit scoring model that can process the borrower’s average repayment risk. Examples
of hard information include age, income, occupation, number of TV sets, and the lender’s
measure of credit quality. This credit quality variable is itself an aggregation of a large
amount of codified borrower attributes and is an internal measure of risk.
Petersen (2004) highlights that soft information on the other hand is either difficult or
8Karlan and Zinman (2009) examine a similarly positioned unsecured cash-based lender in South Africa
and find APR rates of over 200%. The overall default rate for the South African lender is 30% for first time
borrowers. The studied lender’s overall default rate is less than 10%. The average APR for US credit cards
is around 10-15% and may be much higher for payday cash loans.
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costly to codify. To process this type of information, the lender must rely on loan officers
to manually screen the application. In addition, two loan officers may also have honest
disagreements when interpreting soft information such as written notes, photographs, or the
feel of the home when gauging a borrower’s repayment ability. Since I observe the exhaustive
set of codified borrower attributes, I further define soft information as the uncodified data
available to the loan officer but not to the lender or myself. The central tension is that loan
officers can observe a noisy signal from soft information, while automated methods must
form an expectation.
After the local branch employees gather the information, a local supervisor will make an
approval decision on the loan. The approved application files are sent to the central head-
quarters where loan officers will choose the approved loan amount conditional on loan terms.
Due to incomplete reporting standards from the different sales offices, I do not have informa-
tion on rejections that happen before reaching central headquarters. The separation of the
extensive and intensive margins on loan sizes is a unique institutional feature. One reason
for separating authority is to minimize the potential costs of side payments at the branch
level. There is no face to face contact between loan officers and the borrowers although it is
possible for the loan officers to contact borrowers through other channels.
Once the central headquarters receives the application, it is randomly assigned to a loan
officer for processing. My data include 21 loan officers but not all of the loan officers worked
at all times. In practice, a batch of applications will enter the office and be distributed to loan
officers without presorting.9 This assignment procedure is crucial for identification, which
9Some loan products such as high net worth lending, college credit, or rapid turnaround loans do have
specialized loan officers for screening. The underwriting teams for various products will have specific expe-
rience and training that is tailored for their loan products. For the unsecured cash loans considered here, no
additional specialization occurs.
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guarantees that each loan officer’s portfolio of borrowers has the same ex-ante distribution
of uncodified attributes. Section 4 discusses this random assignment and the necessary
assumptions in more detail. During screening, the loan officer observes the codified borrower
attributes including the lender’s internal measure of credit quality as well as uncodified soft
information. Once screening is complete, the loan officer chooses a loan amount given the
interest rate and payment length.10 I stress that the only lever that the loan officers have in
adjusting the terms of the loan is in choosing the size. The other loan terms are fixed.
1.2.3 Requested amount
One unique feature of the application is that borrowers are asked to report a requested
loan amount. If the approved loan size is larger than the borrower’s self-reported requested
amount, then the full amount requested is approved. If the loan size is smaller, then the
borrower is underfunded. The lender’s stated goal is to choose loan amounts based on the
borrower’s repayment ability rather than trying to satisfy any liquidity demands.11 Once
the determination is complete, the borrower may sign the terms of the loan with no further
recourse for adjustment. The branch offices themselves play no part in adjusting loan terms
beyond approving the borrower. The entire process from initial application to loan disburse-
ment can take between 3 to 7 days. Loan officers process roughly 700 applications a year
with the average file taking 30 to 40 minutes.
10While there is no explicit upper bound on loan size, the highest value I observe is ¥60,000. Loan officers
may need to acquire supervisor approval for very large loan amounts although the exact threshold is not
a codified rule. Ghosh et al. (2013) examine a model where pricing authority depends on the agent’s local
knowledge.
11This allocation mechanism mitigates the effect of adverse selection where borrowers with an ex-ante
higher likelihood of default may request larger loan sizes in anticipation. In this setting, loan officers are able
to directly condition on the borrower’s requested amount when making their decisions. This means that to
the extent there is any cross-sectional relationship between requested loan amounts and defaults, then the
correlation can be directly priced into the size of the loan.
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Figure 1.2.1: Loan amounts and requested amounts by credit quality














15 33 51 69 87 105
Riskier <=          Credit Quality          => Safer
Notes: Sample includes 282 first-time borrowers from June 2012 borrowing a 24 month
loan with an APR of 48%. Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set APR and payment
length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the loan officers. Borrower applications are
randomly assigned to loan officers. Credit quality is an internal measure of borrower quality
from credit scoring - higher values indicate safer borrowers. For each level of credit quality,
the average loan amount and requested amount is averaged over a bandwidth interval of 5.5
units of credit quality. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
Table (1.1) shows that the requested loan amount is generally three times the approved
amount with a large amount of variation. Figure (1.2.1) shows the average requested amount
and approved amount for loans by credit quality, which is an internal measure of borrower
quality. Higher values of credit quality indicate safer borrowers. The graph shows large
and persistent differences between the amount that is requested and the amount that is
ultimately funded.12 Over 90% of borrowers were approved for loan amounts smaller than
12The slope of credit quality on the approved amount is positive and significant, which is difficult to see
at the scale of the graph.
13
requested. Loan officers say that they view the requested amount as a signal about the
borrower’s repayment ability.
While such gaps could be the result of a strategic game where borrowers request larger loan
amounts and anticipate underfunding, it is unlikely to explain all of the variation. Early
repayment fees and immediate first month payment make the costs of excessive borrowing
non-trivial. Also, the average borrower may not be able to predict the loan officer’s lending
behavior. While a very small proportion of borrowers reject loans because the amounts were
too small, there were no cases where borrowers refused a loan for being too large. This gap
is then suggestive of a large demand for borrowing that is constrained by the lender. Adams
et al. (2009) examine a model where loans are constrained due to information asymmetries
such as moral hazard. In addition to this effect, this study will attribute some of the
constraints to idiosyncratic differences across loan officers.
The lender utilizes a variety of tools to incentivize repayment. Subsequent loans may come
with more attractive terms including lower fees and reduced APR. Additional carrots also
come from higher future limits and a simpler approval process.13 Sticks may be collection
calls from external collectors or litigation. Litigation may result in wage garnishments or
court-modified repayment schedules. Accounts delinquent for more than 90 days or 3 pay-
ment periods are generally packaged and sold to collection agencies. The loan officer has
no contact with the borrower after loan origination and she is not involved in collecting
delinquent loans.
13This lender was established in the last 4 years and over 98% of loans are made to first-time borrowers.
Because secondary loans may come with additional information, I restrict all of my analysis to a borrower’s
first loan.
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1.3 Model of the loan officer
In this section, I develop a delegated expertise model following Stoughton (1993) and Bhat-
tacharya and Pfleiderer (1985). The framework is modeled after an investment manager
who must acquire information about a risky asset and then must decide on an investment
level conditional on that information. Borrowers, or the risky assets, have a large demand
for credit limited only by their self-reported requested loan amount. Once given a loan,
borrowers will begin to repay, and their stochastic repayment will be determined by both
screenable and unscreenable factors. The screenable factors can be inferred from both hard
and soft information. Since borrowers apply for a loan product with an advertised interest
rate and payment length, I take the loan terms beyond loan size as given. Endogenizing the
choice of loan products is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the absence of loan officers, the lender can only condition on the codified hard information
when making decisions. However, the lender could do better by delegating decisions to loan
officers. Loan officers can screen uncodified soft information about the borrower, which allows
her to observe a noisy signal about his stochastic repayment. She then must decide on the
size of a loan to approve taking into account the compensation structure, the information
gathered, and the direct impact of increased loan sizes on his repayment. Loan officers are
heterogeneous across three dimensions: risk preferences, screening ability, and beliefs about
screening ability. These characteristics directly influence their loan decisions and may lead
to distortions away from what the lender would prefer. I first introduce the model with
rational expectations and without inconsistent beliefs before completing the full exposition.
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1.3.1 Loan officer’s objective
Figure (1.3.1) illustrates the steps of the loan officer’s problem. Loan officers, who are indexed
by j, have an exponential utility function with heterogeneous risk preferences u(yj) =−e−rjyj
where yj is the loan officer’s compensation net of effort costs. Compensation is given by a
fixed salary α and a year end bonus that is directly proportional to loan profits β∑
i
piij where
i indexes borrowers.14 One important caveat is that there is no explicit algorithm that ties
loan performance to the year end bonus. The formula is not available to myself or to the loan
officers.15 The year end bonus is determined from a performance review between the loan
officers and their supervisors and can be considered as the outcome of a relational contract.
While I do not have data on specific salaries or bonuses, the average salary is ¥42,000 and
the average bonus is ¥3,000 to ¥4,000.
Figure 1.3.1: Loan officer’s decision process
Effort choice
• Chooses a constant screening
ability level for all borrowers.
• Screening ability determines
the precision of a noisy signal.
2. Screening
• Screens soft information ob-
served within a borrower’s ap-
plication.
• Develops posterior beliefs about
the borrower’s repayment func-
tion.
3. Loan choice
• Loan officer’s compensation is
proportional to loan profits.
• Chooses a loan size to maximize
expected utility.
In practice, the compensation scheme is most likely non-linear exhibiting limited liability,
deferred compensation over multiple calender periods, and variable bonus rates Cole et al.
(2013). While the modeling of a linear bonus is admittedly an approximation for tractabil-
ity, the structure is consistent with a reduced form model of career concerns or corporate
14Maximizing an exponential utility function with a linear compensation scheme and normally distributed
errors reduces to maximizing a mean variance utility function Misra et al. (2005). This mean variance utility
form with heterogeneous risk parameter rj is a second order approximation to any utility function.
15The lender is vague about the bonus structure even to the loan officers themselves. One reason may
be to avoid loan officers exploiting the scheme. See Berg et al. (2013) for evidence that loan officers may
manipulate information to pass an approval threshold and increase their pay.
16
obedience where the loan officers are incentivized to maximize loan profits. Even without an
explicit monetary incentive, non-pecuniary motivations such as competition with coworkers
or fear of dismissal could lead her to behave as if she were maximizing expected utility from
loan profits. Furthermore, conversations with the lender, supervisors, and the loan officers
themselves indicate this is a reasonable approximation.
Although the average loan officer is screening 700 applications a year, she may still have
reasons to be risk averse over individual loans. For example, a defaulted loan may warrant
additional scrutiny from supervisors regardless of the performance of her remaining portfolio.
This risk preference is designed to capture her internal tradeoff between the loan’s expected
value and the variance. One detail that will be described more fully is that the bonus rate
β is not separately identified from rjβ. In other words, I cannot rule out that heterogeneous
beliefs about β may also influence her decision.16
Loan officer j has screening ability σ2j that determines her precision from a noisy signal
about the borrower’s repayment risk. It is useful to think of this as an ability because it is
assumed to be constant within a loan officer’s loan portfolio. This constant ability can be
cast as the result of a prior effort choice since the constant screening ability is isomorphic































> 0. Combining everything, loan officers try to
maximize their expected utility given by
16Many loan officers believe that roughly 1% of loan profits are ultimately returned to them as a bonus.
Actual loan profitability data indicate this is a reasonable approximation.
17
EU [Lij ] =
ˆ
−e−rj(α+βpiij−costj(σ2j ))f (pi)dpi (1.3.1)
1.3.2 Loan profits
When borrower i receives a loan of size Lij , he will ultimately repay a proportion η∗i (Lij) of
the total RiLij .17 Ri is the ratio of the total present value of the loan if repaid in full to the
value of the loan and is determined by the interest rate.18 η∗i (Lij) represents the proportion
of the total that is ultimately repaid and is inclusive of penalty, application, early repayment,
and late fees.19 This means that ultimately, some borrowers may return to the lender more
than RiLij . The present value of loan profits is then given by piij =RiLijη∗i (Lij)−Lij . This
model is static in the sense that loan officers do not consider their prior portfolio composition
when underwriting a new loan.20
The borrower’s repayment proportion η∗i (Lij) is composed of four parts: the loan amount
Lij , the codified hard information xi, the uncodified soft information ui, and an exogenous
unscreenable error i. When choosing loan sizes, loan officers must balance the additional
interest earned from loan increases with potentially higher delinquency rates. This delin-
17η∗i (Lij) is a latent variable, while ηi (Lij) is the observed variable due to censoring.
18For a fixed stream of monthly payments, the present discounted value of a loan if repaid in full is given by
PVi = apri1−(1+apri)−N ×
1−(1+i)−N
i Lij where apri is the monthly APR of the loan, N is the payment length,
and i is the lender’s discount rate. Ri is therefore given by apri1−(1+apri)−N ×
1−(1+i)−N
i . i is set at the People’s
Bank of China base interest rate of 6%, and the official Chinese inflation rate is 2%.
19One source of risk for the lender is early repayments. Borrowers financing a wedding may quickly repay
the high interest loan as soon as the cash gifts are deposited. Even though the lender imposes sizable early
repayment fees, over 50% of loans are completed early. The borrower’s decision to be late, to pay late
fees, to pay early, to pay early payment fees, or to default is determined by a number of factors. Modeling
the utility-maximizing repayment decision is outside the scope of this study and is not necessary for the
counterfactual analysis. The repayment decision is treated in reduced form.
20To the extent that loan officers care about portfolio composition, then the estimate of risk preferences
may absorb some preferences towards correlation across loans.
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quency could be due to factors under the borrower’s control as well as circumstance. For
example, borrowers may have a greater incentive to default on larger loans through strategic
default. They may also exert less effort on their own projects, or it could be that larger loan
payments have a greater chance of pushing a borrower into delinquency.21
The next component is hard information xi, which contains all of the codified borrower data
and loan terms. This includes demographics, financial variables, home inspection, workplace
inspection, credit reporting data, and the borrower’s self-reported data including loan request
and loan purpose. Loan officers are assumed to observe the effect of hard information and
loan size on repayment without any ambiguity. This is to mimic the effect of credit scoring,
which aggregates a large amount of codified borrower attributes.22
The next part of η∗i (Lij) is stochastic, idiosyncratic to the borrower, and unobserved to the
econometrician. Loan officers, however, can observe a noisy signal about this screenable
portion of repayment ui. Loan officers rely on uncodified data to infer a borrower’s ability,
personality, and job prospects. For convenience, I term the screenable but unobserved to the
econometrician ui to be called soft information. Soft information is distributed N(0,σ2u) for
all borrowers.23 Soft information is assumed to be uncorrelated with hard information, but
will be correlated with the choice of the loan size.
The last component is an additive error, and represents shocks to repayment that are com-
pletely unscreenable and unpredictable at the time of loan origination. Examples include
21This effect is also known as borrower moral hazard. See Gine et al. (2012) for a model that explicitly
outlines the borrower’s repayment decision through a private action.
22This understates the value of loan officers in two ways. One is that xi contains controls not used in credit
scoring such as time effects, higher order terms, interacted terms, and fixed effects. The other is that loan
officers are only needed to interpret uncodified soft information because all of the codified characteristics are
assumed to already be incorporated via credit scoring. To the extent that loan officers have additional value
to the lender in screening codified information, the bias will only increase the value of manual evaluation.
23Because of the prior loan decision at the branch level, this may be a posterior distribution that already
conditions on the borrower meeting an approval threshold.
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checks getting lost in the mail, unexpected health shocks, or unpredictable job loss. Loan
officers cannot screen this portion of repayment, and must take an expectation over its dis-
tribution. These i shocks are distributed N(0,σ2 ) and by definition are uncorrelated with
hard or soft information.24 Without accounting for the distinction between screenable and
unscreenable risk, the value of subjective evaluation may be overstated.
I further assume that each component is additively separable. Combining the effect of loan
size, hard information, soft information, and the unscreenable error, the borrower will repay
η∗i (Lij) = γLij +x
′
iΓ+ui+ i (1.3.2)
of the total present value RiLij . The marginal effect γ is allowed to vary across different
monthly payments so that two identical borrowers with different loan terms may have dif-
ferent repayment patterns. Adams et al. (2009) find that some households are even more
responsive to down payments than the borrowed amount indicating that accounting for short
term liquidity effects such as monthly payments is crucial.25
Since the total portfolio profit∑
i
piij is linear in individual profits and each borrower’s stochas-
tic portion of repayment ui + i is iid, maximizing utility from the entire loan portfolio is
equivalent to maximizing the utility from each individual loan.26 As mentioned before, loan
officers still have reasons to be risk averse over individual loans despite screening hundreds
of borrowers. For example, a poor performing loan may attract attention regardless of the
24Without loss of generality, any portion of i that is correlated with soft information can be subsumed
within soft information. Mean independence with the hard information is also without loss of generality as
a constant term is included in hard information that captures the conditional expectation.
25Conditional on the payment term N , apr, and the discount rate i, the monthly payment and present
value of the loan are linear functions of loan size. The marginal effect of loan size on repayment can be





26This follows from the exponential utility function without income effects.
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loan officer’s prior loan performance.
1.3.3 Screening signal
While screening, loan officers develop beliefs about the borrower’s screenable portion of re-
payment ui. After observing the file, loan officers observe a noisy signal ωij about the soft
information ui such that ωij = ui+δij . This signal is centered around the borrower’s ui where




is distributed according to the loan officer’s screen-
ing ability. This idiosyncratic term represents noise in accurately predicting a borrower’s
repayment even for a high ability loan officer. Loan officers that are more experienced, bet-
ter trained, or exert more effort may have greater screening abilities and are better able to
observe soft information.













with a non-zero mean and a smaller variance conditional on the signal.27 Crucially, without
loan officers, the lender must take an unconditional expectation over the distribution of ui.
Loan officers with greater ability and a smaller σ2j view ui with more precision than their
peers. Because of the limited number of loan officers in my sample, my data does not have
the power to estimate correlations between the various loan officer characteristics.
27This follows from the conditional distribution of the normal distribution. The covariance between ui+i
and ωij is σ2u since ui and δij are assumed to be independent.
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1.3.4 Optimal loan amount
With the parametrized repayment function, the optimal loan size L∗ij can be solved for as
a function of the loan officer’s structural parameters and the observed signal.28 Given the
posterior belief in equation (1.3.3), the parametrized repayment function in equation (1.3.2),




























This kj is termed the officer effect, and is composed of loan officer characteristics and the
marginal effect of loan size. kj multiplies the loan officer’s belief of repayment, which contains
both hard information and soft information. Some of the costs of distortionary characteristics
can be immediately seen. Loan officers with high risk preferences have a larger officer effect
all else equal. This leads to excessively small loan sizes. The costs of these distortions
are examined in the counterfactual section as alternate lending scenarios are constructed.
Borrowers that are safer both due to hard information or soft information are given larger
loans as expected.
Without additional information about the compensation scheme, α is not identified and β
cannot be separately identified from rjβ. This is an unsurprising result given that the incen-
tive scheme is modeled from career concerns with no explicit variation in β. As mentioned
28This loan size can also be zero, but this is a rare with less than 1% of borrowers being denied at
headquarters. This is because loan decisions are pre-approved already at the branch level before arriving at
headquarters. I exclude borrowers that were denied credit at the headquarters.
29Integrating the expected utility relies on the properties of the moment generating function of the normal
distribution. See Appendix A for the derivation.
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previously, one channel that I cannot rule out is that loan officers may have heterogeneous
beliefs about the bonus rate β. These beliefs on β may interact with risk preferences. The
intuition for identifying the other parameters is addressed in the empirical section.
1.3.5 Screening effort
Screening ability can be cast as the result of a prior effort choice by the loan officer. She must
balance the cost of effort with the benefits of increased precision. I assume that she chooses a
constant level of for all of her loans i.e. constant screening ability. While a more robust model
may exhibit variation in screening effort σ2j across different levels of hard information xi, the
constant effort choice allows for a more tractable estimation strategy. This interpretation is
also consistent with a story where loan officers have many borrower applications to screen
and limited time. Before even opening the application and observing the borrower’s hard
information, she must decide on some amount of time to spend on each file.
Constant screening ability can be mapped to a heterogeneous cost of effort parameter dj .
While the two interpretations are isomorphic, it is still useful to motivate the screening ability
as an effort choice that is subject to the lender’s compensation structure rather than as an








where Fx is the distribution of hard information across borrowers and Fω|σ2j is the conditional
distribution of the signal given effort. The distributions are assumed to be independent. The






























with the derivation in Appendix B.
σ2∗j is increasing in the cost of effort parameter dj indicating that higher cost of effort loan
officers choose higher values of σ2j and less screening ability. The effect of the bonus rate β
on σ2∗j is non-linear and non-monotonic.30 Conditional on the other model parameters, the
screening effort level σ2∗j is isomorphic to the cost of effort parameter dj for σ2j > 0 and when
the marginal effect γ < 0. For interior solutions of loan size, this is likely to be the case or
loan sizes would increase without bound.
To simplify the model and the calculation of the ML gradient, I do not rely on equation
(1.3.6) during estimation. The derived expression can be considered as illustrative for how
cost of effort dj affects the screening effort level σ2j . This approach also avoids functional
form assumptions for the cost of effort parametrization and the distribution of the borrower’s
hard information.31 Another convenience is that this avoids some modeling difficulties. For
example with behavioral overconfidence, loan officers may have inconsistent beliefs about
30Under certain conditions, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) established that the linear compensation
scheme is the optimum incentive contract for principal agent models. For delegated expertise models however,
Stoughton (1993) and Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) find that linear contracts suffer from the irrelevance
result where the agent’s optimum effort level is not a function of a linear bonus. To see this, note that as
γ approaches 0 and the compensation plan becomes linear in loan amounts, the bonus rate β disappears
from equation (1.3.6). An agent can always undo the incentive effects of a linear scheme because the agent
has costless control of a linear action Lij after realization of the signal Stracca (2006). Stoughton (1993)
instead propose a quadratic contract that asymptotically approximates the optimal incentive scheme. The
compensation plan I use is linear in profits but quadratic in loan amounts. This distinction enables the
lender to motivate effort and avoid the irrelevance result.
31Misra and Nair (2011) are able to non-parametrically identify the policy effort function with an assump-
tion that the observed sales is monotonic in effort. Since the loan officer’s output is the return of a noisy
asset, further structure needs to be placed on the model to recover the policy function.
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their screening ability that interact in unclear ways with a separate ability choice.
1.3.6 Heterogeneous beliefs
Equation (1.3.4) makes sharp predictions about low ability loan officers, who should update
and realize that their screening ability is low. These loan officers should discount the signals
that they observe and weigh more heavily the borrower’s hard information such as income
or debt levels. In the limiting case, a loan officer with no ability to screen soft information
should behave as the lender with no variation in loan sizes conditional on hard information.
In addition, the model also implies that low ability loan officers should achieve lower levels of
profit than their high ability peers because of the lower quality of their screening signal. This
ties a sharp relationship between a loan officer’s variance of loan sizes with loan performance.
Allowing for a more flexible empirical relationship will serve as the motivation for introducing
inconsistent beliefs. For example, heterogeneous beliefs allow a loan officer who has a large
amount of variance in her loan decisions to also have poor loan performance i.e. guessing
randomly. Forcing rational expectations may instead erroneously attribute a high variance
to high ability. With rational expectations, I also do not require data on the performance of
the loans to estimate the model. The distribution of loan decisions is enough to pin down
both risk preferences and screening ability. With data on loan performance, I can allow for
more rich behavior and greater heterogeneity.
Moore and Healy (2008) describe one form of overconfidence as an excessive precision in
beliefs. In lab studies, McKenzie et al. (2008) find that participant’s 90% confidence intervals
include the true value only half of the time. This indicates that many people may be
overconfident in their estimates. I interpret these results to mean that loan officers may also
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be overconfident and behave as if their screening signal is more accurate than the true value.
I allow for inconsistent beliefs where a loan officer believes that her screening ability is c2j
rather than σ2j . This flexible specification allows for overconfidence, underconfidence, and
the rational expectations case. I will also be able to formally reject rational expectations as
a restriction on the full model using a likelihood ratio test.
I am agnostic about the underlying cause of this inconsistency. For examples, loan officers
may not know their ability and are guessing, they may be pretending to be of a different type,
or the loan officers could receive random preference shocks for some borrowers.32 Another
explanation could be that loan officers have heterogeneous beliefs about the prior distribu-
tion of the soft information σ2u, which will not be separately identified from σ2j . This will be
expanded upon in the empirical section. Having heterogeneous beliefs about the prior is an-
other form of overconfidence, and ultimately I make no distinction between these alternative
mechanisms. This addition to the model allows for richer screening behaviors than simply
Bayesian updating.













If c2j <σ2j , this means that she believes her screening signal to be more precise than her actual
precision. If c2j > σ2j , this means that the loan officer must be underconfident, while c2j = σ2j
indicates rational expectations. The updated optimal loan amount allowing for inconsistent
32Fisman et al. (2012) find some evidence that loan officers originate loans at higher rates for borrowers
from similar backgrounds. However, the variance of these random preference shocks would also have to be
heterogeneous across loan officers since the empirical model rejects homogenous beliefs.
26




























All else equal, loan officers that are more overconfident have a larger variance of loan decisions
conditional on hard information. This variance now identifies what the loan officer thinks of
her screening ability, while her actual screening ability is identified from the performance of
her loans. Another distortionary cost is that overconfident loan officers view the borrower’s
soft information with some bias, which results in excessively large loans for safer borrowers.
The officer effect kj is also larger, which interacts with risk preferences. Since overconfidence
increases the officer effect, it may offset some of the costs of risk aversion. For a risk averse
loan officer, overconfidence mitigates the tendency to choose small loan amounts. In some
cases with an especially risk averse loan officer, overconfidence may actually increase profits.
This is also why it is crucially important to perform this decomposition because by them-
selves each characteristic may distort loan decisions, but taken together, they may mutually
attenuate.33
1.4 Empirical strategy
Equations (1.3.2) and (1.3.8) jointly determine the borrower’s repayment and the loan of-
ficer’s loan decision respectively. These equations define an econometric model that can
33This is also why the separate identification of overconfidence apart from risk aversion has traditionally
been difficult Goel and Thakor (2008).
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be estimated using maximum likelihood. Before deriving the likelihood, I highlight three
main challenges to estimation: endogenous loan sizes, censored repayment histories, and
identification of the loan officer characteristics. I address these in turn.
1.4.1 Endogenous loan sizes
Without an instrument, Lij in equation (1.3.2) is an endogenous object. This is because
loan amounts are decided after the loan officer observes a signal about soft information
indicating that E [ui|Lij ] 6= 0. One solution is to rely on the application assignment process
as an instrument for exogenous changes in loan amounts. The intuition is that ex-ante
identical borrowers are assigned to different loan officers with different preferences for lending.
However, instead of relying on indicators for each loan officer or the average loan size, the
model suggests a set of ideal instruments. The heterogeneous loan officer characteristics rj ,
σ2j , and c2j are by definition uncorrelated with the borrower’s actual soft information ui, but
correlated with the borrower’s loan amount.
This means that the differences in repayment across loan officers can be causally attributed
to these characteristics. The necessary assumption is that the uncodified soft information
cannot be correlated with the loan officer’s characteristics conditional on codified hard in-
formation E
[
ui|σ2u, rj , c2j ,xi,Lij
]
= 0.34 This assumption is supported by the random as-
signment of borrower applications to loan officers. And because borrowers are not involved
in collecting delinquent loans, there is a natural exclusion restriction. Loan collection is
handled entirely by the local branch offices with no contact from the original loan officer.
34One possible violation is if loan officers collaborate with each other. For example, a loan officer on
a particularly hard to read application may consult with others. The data does not allow me to identify
collaboration in this way, but the large workload should preclude this type of joint inspection from frequently
occurring.
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Table 1.2: First stage and test of correlated observables
Dependent variable: loan amount
21 Loan officer indicators
Joint F-Test 17.18 18.91 19.48 19.59 22.57
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.373 0.420 0.440 0.482 0.525
Loan officer mean loan amount Dependent variable: loan Amount
Coefficient 0.155 0.150 0.153 0.154 0.156
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.367 0.413 0.433 0.476 0.518
Number of controls 78 84 85 129 265
Year by month, city, product X X X X X
Application variables X X X X
Internal credit quality X X X
Financial variables X X
Inspection variables X
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Top panel shows the first stage
test of correlation between loan officers and loan amounts. Second panel shows the test of
correlated observables. Mean loan amount is the loan officer’s average loan amount excluding
borrower i or 1Nj−1
∑
−i
Lij . Application variables include loan amount requested, loan purpose,
and transformations. Internal credit quality is an internal measure of borrower quality
from credit scoring. Financial variables include income, wealth, taxes, social security, credit
reports, external debt, and transformations. Inspection variables include home financing,
home living arrangement, extensive occupation details, home furnishing, tenure in workplace,
payment length dummies, and others. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
The only effect that loan officers have on repayment is through the choice of loan size.
Table (1.2) provides evidence that loan officers are heterogeneous and approve different
loan sizes. The specifications can be thought of as a first stage and show an F-test for the
equality of loan officer indicators. Despite including hundreds of controls accounting for hard
information such as year by month effects, city controls, application variables, and extensive
financial and inspections variables, loan officers are still heterogeneous with respect to loan
sizes. The large test statistic across all specifications indicates that the random assignment of
loan officers has sufficient correlation with loan sizes. These differences also lead to variation
in loan profits across loan officers.
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Furthermore, it is not necessary that the assignment be unconditionally random. The iden-
tification assumption is still valid as long as the borrowers are randomly assigned conditional
on the observed hard information. Loan officers may specialize in borrowers from specific
cities or time windows, but they cannot specialize in cases with particularly high or low
values of soft information ui within those categories.35 This assumption can be examined
using a test for correlated observables. The rationale is that if observable attributes are not
correlated with a loan officer’s portfolio, than it is less likely that unobservable attributes
are correlated.
When examining the approval rates for disability examiners, Maestas et al. (2013) sug-





Lij . By examining the regression of Lij on this variable along with additional co-
variates, I can test for correlated observables. This is because only borrower attributes that
are correlated with the loan officer’s average loan amount should change its coefficient when
added to the regression. Table (1.2) shows the results in the second panel for increasing
collections of hard information. The stable values across specifications provides evidence
that loan officers do not specialize in observed borrower types beyond time and city. Ex-
tending the logic, this also supports the assumption that loan officers do not specialize within
borrower types either.
35Given the volume of cases, it would be difficult and impractical for a pre-screener to give the borrowers
with lower than expected ui to certain loan officers. The lender asserts that applications are not pre-sorted
beyond time and city. This is because loan officers do not all work at the same time and applications from
the same branch office may be frequently batched together. The lender does rely on separate underwriting
departments for its other products such as high net worth loans or college loans.
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1.4.2 Censored repayment
Another empirical challenge is censoring in the borrower’s repayment data. I do not observe








because many of the outstanding
loans have not yet completed by the end of the study period. The data include 26 months
of loans from 2011 to 2014 where the most common loan has a term length of 24 months.
I have repayment data for those loans through 2014, and observe roughly 9,500 completed
loans. I account for the remainder by estimating with a Tobit specification. Specifically, if η¯i

























For example, if the data period ends with a borrower making 6 of 12 required payments, then
ηij = η¯i = .5 ignoring adjustments due to discounting. The likelihood function accounts for




is weakly greater since the lender would not refund payments back to
the borrower. Uncensored contracts are those where no further payments are expected and
include completed contracts and defaulted borrowers.36 With the lender engaged throughout
the year, the censoring point only depends on the date of origination and is assumed to not






Figure 1.4.1: Average loan amount by credit quality
24 month loans at 48% APR from June 2012
Officer A Mean Loan
Officer B Mean Loan


















15 33 51 69 87 105
Riskier <=          Credit Quality          => Safer
Notes: Sample includes 282 first-time borrowers from June 2012 borrowing a 24 month
loan with an APR of 48%. Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set APR and payment
length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the loan officers. Borrower applications are
randomly assigned to loan officers. Credit quality is an internal measure of borrower quality
from credit scoring - higher values indicate safer borrowers. For each level of credit quality,
the loan officer’s average loan amount is averaged over a bandwidth interval of 5.5. As of
August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
1.4.3 Loan officer characteristics
I next give some intuition for the identification of the loan officer parameters. Since borrower
applications are randomly assigned to loan officers, the distribution of unobserved borrower
attributes ui + i across loan officers is ex-ante identical. If all loan officers were identical,
then conditional on the hard information xi, the distribution of loan sizes across all loan
36I rely on the lender’s definition of a defaulting loan being 90 days past due or three payment periods.
After the 90 day mark, the loans are usually packaged and sold to collections agencies. In some cases,
delinquent loans go to litigation.
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Figure 1.4.2: Variance of loan size by credit quality
24 month loans at 48% APR from June 2012
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15 30 45 60 75 90 105
Riskier <=          Credit Quality          => Safer
Notes: Sample includes first-time borrowers from June 2012 examined by 2 loan officers.
Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set APR and payment length. Approved loan
amounts are decided by the loan officers. Borrower applications are randomly assigned to
loan officers. Credit quality is an internal measure of borrower quality from credit scoring
- higher values indicate safer borrowers. For each level of credit quality, the loan officer’s
loans are plotted with a 95% confidence interval. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
officers should be the same. However, heterogeneity in loan officer characteristics leads to
differences in loan decisions. For example, heterogeneity in risk preferences lead some loan
officers to approve larger loan amounts.
This prediction can be seen using the actual borrower data to examine differences in approved
loan amounts across loan officers. Figure (1.4.1) plots the average loan amount for loan
officers against the internal measure of credit quality where higher values indicate safer
borrowers. For comparable loans made with the same loan terms in the same month, Officer
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A approves larger average loan amounts than Officer B for every level of risk. All else equal,
Officer A is less risk averse than Officer B.37
The variance of a loan officer’s loan sizes identifies the loan officer’s belief about her screening
ability. Loan officers that believe that they have no ability to screen should have less variance
of loan sizes conditional on hard information. This prediction is highlighted in Figure (1.4.2)
that plots a scatter of loans approved by two officers in the same month and same terms
against credit quality. With the bands representing 95% confidence intervals, Officer D has
a greater spread in her loan decisions than Officer C at every level of risk. All else equal,
Officer D must be more overconfident than Officer C.
The loan officer’s actual screening ability can be seen with how her loans perform where low
ability loan officers should have worse performing loans. Figure (1.4.3) shows a scatter of
defaulted and completed loans against credit quality for two loan officers. Note that loan
performance includes default, late fees, early repayment fees, and other ancillary fees so that
profitability is not determined solely by default. However, this is a useful visual proxy to
understand the relationship. For comparable loans, Officer F has higher performing loans
than Officer E showing that Officer F must have greater screening ability than Officer E all
else equal.38
37In practice, maximum likelihood identifies all of the loan officer characteristics and the borrower repay-
ment function jointly using the full distribution rather than just these moments. For example, the absolute
level of risk aversion is also determined from the borrower’s repayment function since risk neutral lending is
where marginal profit is equal to 0.
38I do not impose a correlation structure between loan officer characteristics, and each loan officer’s
characteristics may be correlated in different ways. With only 21 loan officers, it would be difficult to
recover parameters that are identified across loan officers.
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Figure 1.4.3: Loan defaults by credit quality
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Riskier <=          Credit Quality          => Safer
Officer F
Notes: Sample includes first-time borrowers from June 2012 examined by 2 loan officers.
Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set APR and payment length. Approved loan
amounts are decided by the loan officers. Borrower applications are randomly assigned to
loan officers. Credit quality is an internal measure of borrower quality from credit scoring
- higher values indicate safer borrowers. Defaulted loans are delinquent for more than 2
payment periods. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
1.4.4 Decomposing the variance of repayment
Some variables are difficult to identify. The variance of loan repayment recover the sum
σ2u+σ2 but not the individual components. This is because there is no observable source of
variation affecting one and not the other. The principle difficulty is trying to decompose the
variance into a portion that is screenable versus unscreenable. If there was a loan officer that
could perfectly observe the soft information ui without any overconfidence, then the loan
decisions of that loan officer would be able to separate σ2u and σ2 . However, without such
35
a perfect loan officer, I can only recover the composite and not the component pieces. For
this reason, the counterfactual exercises also cannot model a loan officer that has a perfectly
accurate signal.
Instead of relying on functional form assumptions or placing additional structure on the
model, I consider a different approach. I use a change of variables that allows me to
estimate the model parameters as functions of the underlying variance of soft informa-
tion σ2u. This change rewrites the model using a reduced set of parameters but with an
identical likelihood function with the proof in Appendix C. Instead of the parameter set
Θ =
(
Γ,γ,rj ,σ2j , c2j ,σ2u,σ2
)






















σ2 = σ2u+σ2 −1
)
(1.4.2)
This normalization has three main benefits. The first is that it removes the need to specify
how much of the variance is screenable versus unscreenable, but still allows for the model
to accommodate the distinction. Screening models that do not account for this difference
implicitly assume that evaluators can observe signals that occur after origination such as an
unpredictable shock. This means that all else equal, increases in the variance of repayment
for any reason strictly increase the value of evaluators versus automated methods. Second,
the change of variables is monotonic so that loan officers that are overconfident in the orig-





allows straightforward comparisons both within and across loan officers. Last and most im-
portantly, this change still allows for counterfactual lending models that change the loan
officer’s behavior.39
39In addition to not being able to assemble a perfect loan officer, I also cannot examine counterfactuals
that vary the composition of screenable versus unscreenable risk. I can however perform counterfactuals that
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1.4.5 Maximum likelihood
Deriving the actual likelihood function is straightforward. For ease of exposition, I write
the likelihood in terms of the full set of parameters and not the adjusted set. Appendix









joint density can be written as the product of a conditional and a marginal using Bayes’








. Since the stochastic piece in both


































where wij = x
′
iΓkj − kjR , σ2v = k2j
σ4u(σ2u+σ2j )(
σ2u+c2j










+σ2 . This likelihood function is a Tobit model with an endogenous regressor
and an observation-specific censoring point. Estimation relies on an analytic gradient and
Hessian using a modified Newton-Raphson search algorithm.40
1.5 Results and counterfactuals













The parameters allow me to construct an econometrician’s prediction without loan officers
increase or decrease the overall amount of variance.
40I do not present a proof for global concavity of the likelihood, however, different initial values converged
to a stable estimate.
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and based entirely on the codified hard information. By comparing the status quo to this
prediction, I observe the net value of delegating to loan officers compared to an automated
decision. I can also examine counterfactuals designed to mitigate the distortionary costs of
the loan officer characteristics by adjusting their values. By comparing these counterfactuals
with the status quo, I can recover the costs to the lender.
1.5.1 Borrower repayment function





ing equation (1.3.2), loan size, monthly payment, and the present value of full repayment all
affect repayment through γ. Higher borrowed amounts decrease repayment, while a higher
monthly payment increases the proportion returned. With an average repayment proportion
around 80%, it is not surprising that higher monthly payments lead to greater loan recovery
all else equal. While the individual γ estimates are difficult to compare because of different
interest rates and payment lengths, γ for the most common loan type with a 24 month loan
and an APR of 48% is -.5%. In other words, an increase of ¥10,000 in the size of the loan
leads to a decrease of 5% of the total payment RiLij .41
To put this into context, a loan of size ¥34,450 for 24 months at an APR of 48% has a
total present value of ¥49,500. This is the value of the loan if the borrower repays in full
41The magnitude can be compared to the literature, but the comparison is not straightforward because
most studies investigate the impact on default and not repayment. In addition, differences in institutional
setting make cross-country comparisons difficult. Despite this concerns, the estimates are roughly consistent.
In the US subprime auto financing market, Adams et al. (2009) find that a 1% increase in loan amounts
leads to a 1.6% increase in the chance of default. By running the same specification with default instead
of repayment on the same sample, Wang (2014a) finds that a similar 1% increase in loan size leads to a
.6% increase in the chance of default. Other estimates of γ find either very small or sometimes positive
magnitudes. Dobbie and Skiba (2013) find that increases in loan size lead to a slight decrease in default
when examining US payday lenders. However, their estimates cannot reject no change.
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Table 1.3: Estimates of the borrower repayment function
Loan terms
Coefficient P-Value
Loan amount -0.016 0.000
Monthly payment 0.038 0.000
Present discounted value 0.006 0.000
Variance of soft information and error σ2u+σ2 0.115 0.000
γ for a 24 month loan with an APR of 48%. -0.005
Selected hard information
Coefficient P-Value
Payroll income 1.6e-5 0.000
External debt 1.1e-6 0.059
Credit card utilization -0.008 0.101
Management position 0.024 0.000
Female indicator 0.002 0.071
Amount requested 1.7e-4 0.000
Dorm or rental indicator -0.019 0.000
Credit quality 1.0e-5 0.838
Air conditioner units 0.004 0.001
Met family/coworkers 0.008 0.001
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan
amount with a set APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the
loan officers. Borrower repayment parameters are from the main MLE specification. The
monthly payment varies with payment length and APR. PDV is the total repayment if the
loan is repaid in full and includes fees. Additional controls include year by month, city,
product fixed effects, and additional application, financial, and inspection variables. As of
August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
each period without incurring any penalty late fees or paying early fees. By extending an
additional ¥1,000 to this borrower, two effects occur. One is that additional interest is earned
on the marginal loan increase, but this change may be offset by the fall in repayments on the
inframarginal repayments. These two effects can be seen in Figure (1.5.1) where past a point,
marginal profit decreases. The lender’s average loan amount for these terms indicate that the
marginal loan amount may be profitable. Karlan and Zinman (2010) attribute marginal loan
profitability to overly conservative risk assessment, which I take this as further motivation
that risk preferences may explain this gap.
The variance estimate of ui + i of .115 in Table (1.3) shows that there is still substantial
39
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Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrower repayment parameters
are from the main MLE specification. The average borrower is constructed by setting all
covariates to their average values for a 24 month loan with an APR of 48%. The discount
rate is set to the People’s Bank of China base interest rate of 6%. As of August 2014, $1 is
¥6.18.
variation in repayment conditional on hard information. As this variance increases, more
of the variation in repayment cannot be screened by hard information alone. However, this
does not necessarily imply that loan officers increase in value with a greater variance. As the
variance of screenable risk σ2u increases relative to unscreenable risk σ2 , the screening value
of loan officers increases as more of the variation can be screened. However, the breakdown
between these component pieces is not identified.
Some of the additional covariates are also of interest. Managers and women all repay at
above average rates. Dorm or rental indicators in China generally imply young, migrant,
40
or transient workers, and it is not surprising that their repayment rates are correspondingly
lower than average. Some of the home inspection items such as air conditioner units or
conversations with family and coworkers also indicate that household wealth and openness
are associated with higher rates of repayment.42
1.5.2 Loan officer characteristics
Table (1.4) presents the estimates of the adjusted loan officer characteristics: risk preferences
∼
rj , screening belief
∼
c2j , and screening ability
∼
σ2j . Interpreting these estimates is difficult as
they are functions of the bonus rate β and the variance of soft information σ2u. However, some
conclusions can be drawn. The estimated values for ∼rj = rjβ are all positive indicating that
all of the loan officers have positive risk preferences.43 This means that the marginal loan
amount is profitable for all of the loan officers. Another conclusion is that there is substantial
heterogeneity across loan officers in risk preferences. Table (1.5) displays a likelihood ratio
test for a restricted model of homogenous risk preferences for all loan officers. The data is
sufficient to reject this null.
The second and third columns in Table (1.4) shows the estimate of screening beliefs and
screening ability for all of the loan officers. The change of variables still allows comparisons








42I urge caution when interpreting the coefficients on hard information since many of the included variables
are higher order terms, interactions, or functions of existing variables. For instance, the lender’s credit quality
variable is itself a function of salaried income and other attributes such as education. The purpose of this
exercise is to mimic a predictive model and not to assign causal interpretations to borrower attributes apart
from the size of the loan.
43There are no constraints placed on ∼rj during estimation. Having a negative
∼
rj may indicate risk loving
behavior by some loan officers. Agarwal and Ben-David (2014) find that some loan officers take excessive
risks given that their screening effort conveys little information. These excessive risks may be erroneously
attributed to risk aversion if overconfidence is not allowed.
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Table 1.4: Estimates of the loan officer parameters
Risk preferences Screening beliefs Screening ability
Officer #1 0.004 124.9 *** 129.7 *
Officer #2 0.011 *** 476.5 1917.0
Officer #3 0.018 *** 96.4 *** 107.8 **
Officer #4 0.010 *** 262.4 *** 753.2 *
Officer #5 0.001 151.6 *** 181.1 **
Officer #6 0.009 *** 294.2 ** 968.2
Officer #7 0.005 ** 440.0 *** 1767.0
Officer #8 0.008 *** 186.5 *** 324.1
Officer #9 0.006 ** 199.7 *** 320.5 *
Officer #10 0.010 *** 243.3 *** 550.2 **
Officer #11 0.010 *** 267.8 *** 620.4 **
Officer #12 0.005 * 289.5 ** 744.0
Officer #13 0.010 *** 78.9 *** 87.7 *
Officer #14 0.008 *** 210.8 *** 434.1 *
Officer #15 0.001 223.2 *** 444.8
Officer #16 0.015 *** 196.9 ** 272.2
Officer #17 0.006 ** 268.0 * 555.1
Officer #18 0.010 *** 297.1 *** 1026.0 **
Officer #19 0.007 *** 462.7 1708.0
Officer #20 0.007 *** 288.7 *** 583.6 **
Officer #21 0.011 *** 200.7 *** 389.6
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Estimates are from the main
MLE specification and are the adjusted variables in terms of β and σ2u.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.







−1. All of the loan officers are overconfident
indicating that the loan officers behave as if their screening ability is much more precise
than shown by the data. It is informative to characterize how an underconfident loan officer
would behave. Holding screening ability σ2j constant, as c2j increases, the variance of loan
decisions conditional on hard information will decrease, loan sizes will decrease, and loan
repayment will decrease as well. Underconfident loan officers therefore have smaller but
worse performing loans.
Table (1.5) shows specification tests for homogenous screening beliefs and for homogenous
screening ability. Both of these nulls are rejected at the 10% level. Another specification
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Table 1.5: Likelihood ratio tests
Likelihood ratio test
Null: X 2 P-value
Loan officers have homogenous risk preferences rj = r∀j . 471 0.000
Loan officers have homogenous screening beliefs c2j = c2∀j. 31 0.051
Loan officers have homogenous screening ability σ2j = σ2∀j. 32 0.042
Loan officers have rational expectations c2j = σ2j ∀j. 446 0.000
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Likelihood ratio test statistics
are on the parameter estimates from the main MLE specification.
test is the rational expectations restriction that loan officers have accurate beliefs about
their screening ability or c2j = σ2j for all of the loan officers. The likelihood ratio test rejects
this hypothesis convincingly showing that loan officers seem to be overconfident about their
screening ability.44 A model that does not allow for inconsistent beliefs would attribute
the poor loan performance of some low ability loan officers to excessive variance in loan
repayments. Together, these results provide evidence that there is heterogeneity in risk pref-
erences, screening beliefs, and screening ability. Furthermore, loan officers are overconfident
about their screening ability. However, to measure the value of these loan officers, it is
necessary to construct counterfactuals.
1.5.3 Status quo lending profits
The model can calculate expected loan profits in the status quo for each of the loan officer’s
approved loans. Using these, I can compare to the econometrician’s prediction as well as
alternative counterfactuals.45 The status quo uses the estimated parameters and matches the
44The estimates are imprecise when claiming that individual loan officers are overconfident.
45It is possible to use the realized profits instead of the expected profits for the status quo. This approach is
unattractive because many loans are censored and do not have realized profits. This also maintains consistent
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observed loan decisions. Using the loan officer characteristics, I first invert equation (1.3.8)
for the biased signal that the loan officer must have observed. This signal is a function of
her characteristics, the borrower’s hard information, and the approved loan amount. This
signal relates both the loan officer’s belief about expected profit as well as the loan’s actual
expected profit through equation (1.3.7).
Specifically for each loan officer, the officer effect kj is calculated using the adjusted param-
























Because loan officers are overconfident, the correct posterior mean of soft information is














































comparisons with the expected profits from the counterfactuals. A simulation approach that calculates the
expected profits for counterfactual borrowers also is not possible. This is because I cannot separate soft
information from the exogenous error, and therefore cannot simulate alternative borrowers.
44
cover the value of loan officers.
1.5.4 Econometrician’s prediction
The structural model allows for counterfactual lending under different scenarios. One is
to examine an econometrician’s prediction without delegating to loan officers and relying
only on the codified hard information. How would loan sizes and loan profits change if
an econometrician made decisions without the distortionary characteristics faced by loan
officers?46 Given equation (1.3.2), the profit-maximizing loan amount for an econometrician










Contrast this with the loan officer’s loan amount in equation (1.3.8). The econometrician’s
effect (−2γ)−1 is much larger than the officer effect kj due to risk neutral lending. The
econometrician has consistent beliefs about his lack of screening ability and must take an
expectation over soft information unlike the overconfident loan officer. This results in no
loan variation conditional on hard information.












46Heider and Inderst (2012) examine a model where competition between lenders causes lenders to disre-
gard soft information and rely solely on observable characteristics. The role of the loan officer changes to a
salesperson prospecting for borrowers rather than as evaluators. Berger et al. (2005) find that the costs of
collecting soft information rise with the size of the lender. Past a certain volume, lenders may not find it
worthwhile to continue to collect soft information.
45























Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. Data includes 31,954 first-time bor-
rowers from December 2011 to January 2014 across more than 40 branches examined by
21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set APR and payment length.
Approved loan amounts are decided by the loan officers. Econometrician’s prediction is risk
neutral lending based only on hard information. The econometrician’s average loan amounts
equal ¥38,000 and average profits are ¥11,000. For each counterfactual, each borrower’s
loan amount is re-optimized and expected profit is calculated. As of August 2014, $1 is
¥6.18.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table (1.6) compares the econometrician’s expected profit with the status quo. The average
loan amount is ¥38,000, which is 14% higher than the status quo amount of ¥33,450. This
large gap is unsurprising given the higher risk preferences of the individual loan officers.
However, average loan profits are about ¥200 higher and significant at the 10% level. The
average loan officer screens 700 applications per year, which results in roughly ¥140,000
in additional yearly profits over the econometrician. With an annual pay of ¥45,000, loan
officers outperform the econometrician by more than three times their pay.
Despite the distortionary costs of heterogeneous characteristics, loan officers are still prof-
itable compared to an econometrician’s prediction. The econometrician enjoys unfair advan-
tages in this comparison. One advantage is making loan decisions after observing the bor-
46
rower’s actual repayment behavior, which allows the econometrician to make an in-sample
prediction using ex-post data.47 Another is that the econometrician has access to time and
area effects, access to prohibited controls such as gender, and is allowed to be risk neutral.48
With these advantages, the econometrician is likely to outperform automated algorithms
that the lender would have had access to at the time of origination.
Despite these advantages, loan officer decisions are still more profitable. However, this value
varies across loan officers. Figure (1.5.2) compares the status quo to the econometrician
for all of the loan officers individually. While some loan officers may not outperform the
econometrician, some are extremely valuable although the estimates are imprecise. The loan
officers are all profitable according to net present value, but some may not outperform the
econometrician.
1.5.5 Minimum estimated risk aversion
Another set of counterfactuals are designed to mitigate the distortionary costs of loan officer
characteristics. One example is to examine lending if loan officers behaved with less risk aver-
sion. Specifically, I construct a lending model where all of the loan officers behave with risk
preferences equal to that of the least risk averse loan officer. The procedure first requires
calculating an updated officer effect kj and then recalculating the loan amount LMinRAij .
Since the adjusted risk aversion estimate ∼rj = rjβ is a scalar multiple of the bonus rate β,
the loan officer with the lowest value of rj also has the lowest value of
∼
rj after the monotonic











47If the econometrician’s model included individual borrower indicators, then it would outperform any
screening model.
48Misra et al. (2005) consider a model where the principal may also have risk preferences.
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Figure 1.5.2: Status quo versus the econometrician





























Notes: 95% confidence interval constructed from bootstrapped standard errors. Data in-
cludes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014 across more than
40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set
APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the loan officers. Status
quo lending is with the estimated parameters. Econometrician’s prediction is risk neutral
lending based only on hard information. Each borrower’s loan amount is re-optimized and
expected profit is calculated. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
ter solving for the original signal in equation (1.5.1), the updated loan amount and expected
loan profits are given similarly to equations (1.3.8) and (1.5.3).
This change increases average loan sizes and profits since the original loan amount was
approved with higher risk preferences. However, this effect is not ambiguously beneficial
to the lender and it could be possible that some loans actually see a decrease in expected
profit. To see this, suppose an extremely overconfident loan officer received a signal about
the borrower’s soft information. Overconfidence leads her to erroneously believe the borrower
48
is low risk, but this tendency is counteracted by risk aversion which decreases average loan
amounts. By behaving with less risk aversion, the distortion created by overconfidence may
dominate the risk aversion effect. The result may be that some loan amounts are excessively
large and less profitable than otherwise. The effectiveness of the counterfactual on loan
profits is then largely an empirical question.
Figure 1.5.3: Minimum risk aversion versus the econometrician





























Notes: 95% confidence interval constructed from bootstrapped standard errors. Data in-
cludes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014 across more than
40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set
APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the loan officers. Coun-
terfactual lending is if all loan officers behaved with the minimum estimated risk aversion.
Econometrician’s prediction is risk neutral lending based only on hard information. Each
borrower’s loan amount is re-optimized and expected profit is calculated. As of August 2014,
$1 is ¥6.18.
Table (1.6) reports that the average loan size of ¥37,440 is significantly higher than the
49
status quo, and statistically indistinguishable from the econometrician’s prediction. This
is expected as loan amounts increase. Profits are ¥320 higher for every loan. With 700
applications a year, this counterfactual brings an additional profit of ¥224,000 above the
econometrician. This is about five times the average loan officer’s compensation. Compared
to the status quo, this is roughly ¥110 more per loan. This is the cost to the lender
of risk preferences, which over the course of a year is the pay of an additional two loan
officers. Figure (1.5.3) shows the profit comparison for individual loan officers versus the
econometrician. The majority now statistically outperform the econometrician with some
achieving additional profits of over ¥1,000 per loan.
1.5.6 Rational expectations
Another counterfactual is to look at changes in loan sizes and loan profits if loan officers
behaved with rational expectations. This imposes c2j = σ2j for all loan officers. The procedure
for determining counterfactual loan profits follows the counterfactual on risk aversion, which











































where the adjusted signal can be calculated from equation (1.5.2) and expected profit is
similar to equation (1.5.5).
Without overconfidence, average loan sizes must decrease but so might profits due to two
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effects. The first is because an overconfident loan officer has a larger officer effect kj due to
the smaller c2j . Overconfidence attenuates the effect of risk preferences so that by reducing
overconfidence, loan amounts and profits may decrease further.49 The second effect is be-




ωij . This also interacts with risk
preferences so that with accurate beliefs about screening ability, risky borrowers are given
larger loans and safer borrowers are given smaller loans. This is another important reason
for this decomposition. A naive lender that blindly implements rational expectations could
decrease profits without accounting for risk preferences.
Table (1.6) shows that the impact on average loan amounts decreases but is not statistically
significant. Profits, however, are ¥350 larger. Loan officers now contribute 5.5 times their
compensation in additional annual profits over the econometrician. Profits are also ¥140
higher than the status quo indicating large costs imposed by overconfidence. Figure (1.5.4)
shows that most loan officers now beat the econometrician. However, the point estimate for
some of the loan officers decreases due to less overconfidence. For example, loan officer 3 sees
her profits decrease by more than ¥30 per loan. For particularly high levels of risk aversion,
some amount of overconfidence may be profitable.
1.5.7 Highest estimated screening ability
One last counterfactual compares loan amounts and profits when loan officers have greater
screening ability. If all loan officers had the highest estimated screening ability, then screening
49Even with a precise signal, it may be possible that some loan officers are not willing to increase loans to
the point where marginal profit equals zero. This fear may be driven by herd behavior or career concerns
where a failing loan given to an observably risky borrower may be blamed on the loan officer. See Borenstein
et al. (2012) for a career concerns model where the agent willfully deviates from the profit-maximizing
outcome to avoid possible blame.
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Figure 1.5.4: Rational expectations versus the econometrician





























Notes: 95% confidence interval constructed from bootstrapped standard errors. Data in-
cludes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014 across more than
40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set
APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the loan officers. Coun-
terfactual lending is if all loan officers behaved with no overconfidence. Econometrician’s
prediction is risk neutral lending based only on hard information. Each borrower’s loan
amount is re-optimized and expected profit is calculated. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
would be more precise. The procedure begins by recognizing that the officer effect kj does
not change from the status quo since kj is not directly a function of screening ability but
of screening beliefs. The loan officer with the lowest value of σ2j must also have the lowest
adjusted
∼
σ2j from the change of variables. Since the realization of ωij changes with greater
screening ability, a different approach must be taken in calculating the adjusted signal. The
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To maintain consistent comparisons with the status quo, I rescale the original signal instead

















This normalizes the value of the counterfactual signal ωHighij without having to draw a new
stochastic value. The benefit to this approach instead of simulating from the distribution
in equation (1.5.7) is that this allows for a consistent comparison with the status quo. As
σ2Min approaches σ2j , the counterfactual values equal the status quo. The loan officer’s biased

















































This change should not affect average loan sizes since a more accurate signal leads to larger
loans for safer borrowers and smaller loans for riskier borrowers. Average profits increase
because loan officers are more effective at screening. Table (1.6) finds that average profits
are ¥640 higher in the counterfactual case indicating that loan officers contribute 10 times
their pay in additional profits compared to the econometrician. This is now ¥430 more
per loan than the status quo, which is the yearly equivalent of hiring an additional seven
loan officers. The lender should be willing to hire seven additional loan officers to increase
screening ability to the maximum estimated level. Figure (1.5.5) shows this effect for each
loan officer and finds that almost all of the loan officers are above the Mendoza line.50
1.5.8 Implementation
Implementing these counterfactuals may be difficult. Because these depend on knowing
the parameters of the individual loan officers, there may be a ratchet effect as loan officers
vary their behavior anticipating that the lender is learning about them Gibbons (1987). In
addition, the composition of the loan officers may change in response to these attempts to
alter their behavior Lazear (2000). With that said, some of the counterfactuals may be
possible to implement with post-origination scaling if the lender could hold constant their
behavior. For example, one way to mitigate risk preferences is to increase each loan based
on the loan officer’s officer effect kj . This requires that loan officers report truthfully, which
may require compensation according to the initial loan decision.
For rational expectations, if simply informing the loan officer of her behavioral bias is in-
sufficient, then it may also be possible to use ex-post adjustments. Overconfidence leads
50An expression in baseball that gives the batting average where players below this threshold cannot
contribute positively to the team regardless of other strengths. The loan officer would have to contribute
about ¥65 per loan above the econometrician to equal her average ¥45,000 compensation.
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loan officers to exaggerate the precision of their signal. The lender could intervene by com-
pressing loan amounts so that larger loans are reduced and smaller loans are increased. As
long as the loan officer still has the incentives to truthfully report the initial decision, then
it could be possible to reduce this distortion. However, care must be taken so that the
design can account for offsetting interactions between risk preferences and overconfidence.
Increasing screening ability may be much more difficult and require structural changes in
hiring51, training, and compensation. Equation (1.3.6) shows that the effect of the bonus
rate β on the optimal choice of ability to be non-linear and non-monotonic, which could be
one method to induce greater ability.
Increasing the bonus rate may also exacerbate the costs of risk preferences since greater profit
sharing encourages less risk. In addition, the costs of inducing additional ability may not
be profitable for the lender and could be much larger than the benefits. Another possibility
is to potentially increase the amount of hard information and reduce soft information by
codifying more of the collected data as in Berg et al. (2013) or collecting more information.
This could reduce the amount of information that loan officers need to screen, which may
lead to more precise signals. An alternate policy may be to have additional loan officers
screen the same borrower provided that loan officers can communicate their soft information
to each other without ambiguity.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the value of delegating loan decisions to loan officers exhibiting
three sources of heterogeneity: risk preferences, screening ability, and beliefs about screening
51Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) find that matching between principals and agents may be important in
determining the optimal structure of contracts.
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ability. To weigh the costs and benefits, I developed a structural model where loans officers
were delegated two choices. The first was a costly screening decision used to analyze uncodi-
fied soft information unobserved by credit scoring, and the second was a loan size choice that
incorporated both soft and hard information. The model featured multiple dimensions of
heterogeneity, recovered the borrower’s repayment, and accounted for potential endogeneity
with the random assignment of borrower applications to loan officers. I found three main
results.
First, there was substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences, screening ability, and beliefs
about screening ability across loan officers. I further found that loan officers were uniformly
risk averse and overconfident. These characteristics led to large distortions in average loan
amounts and loan profits. Second, delegating to loan officers was more profitable than
relying on an econometrician’s prediction based only on hard information. Estimates showed
that the average loan officer with an annual compensation of ¥45,000 contributed ¥147,000
more in annual profits compared to the econometrician despite the econometrician’s many
advantages. This effect was heterogeneous with some loan officers unable to contribute
additional value, while others were extremely valuable. Lastly, these characteristics distorted
loan decisions and were very costly for the lender. These costs were the equivalent of hiring
an additional two to seven loan officers.
I view these results as highlighting the value of expert loan officers even when decisions can
be based on a large amount of hard information. These benefits are especially pronounced
in settings with limited formal credit histories such as personal or small business loans. This
is evident from the rise in popularity of peer to peer lenders such as Prosper or Lending
Club that use subjective evaluation to augment their existing credit metrics. This is not to
say that delegating to experts is always valuable compared to alternative decision-making
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processes. For example, Gruber (1996) finds that passive investment management generally
outperforms active managers in mutual funds. In addition, some contexts prohibit extensive
collection of soft information such as appearance and demographic. With that said, despite
the costs, these loan officers were very profitable.
More broadly, an insight of this paper is that it is difficult to evaluate expertise without
jointly modeling a number of factors both environmental and innate. Consideration must
be given to the information collection process, the expert’s preferences, the efficacy of the
alternative decision model, and the compensation scheme.52 On this last point, this research
also highlights the importance of incentive schemes in principal agent relationships beyond
pecuniary benefits. Agents in all settings may respond to soft incentives such as career
concerns much more than just pay. Beyond lending, this work provides a valuable framework
that is useful in evaluating experts working elsewhere in program evaluation or assessment.
I view the study of this type of decision-making as an important avenue for further study.
52Another reason to hire experts could be to avoid directly specifying a rule that may skirt regulation.
For example, some universities may use admissions counselors to implement racial policies that would be
controversial if programmed explicitly in an automated model.
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Figure 1.5.5: High screening ability versus the econometrician





























Notes: 95% confidence interval constructed from bootstrapped standard errors. Data in-
cludes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014 across more than
40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set
APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the loan officers. Coun-
terfactual lending is if all loan officers behaved with the highest estimated screening effort.
Econometrician’s prediction is risk neutral lending based only on hard information. Each




Decomposing moral hazard in lending: evidence from
China
2.1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Akerlof (1970), economists have known that asymmetric informa-
tion imposes costs on markets. One such market is lending where moral hazard effects can
lead to loan rationing and credit constraints Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). To remedy these costs,
policymakers and researchers have suggested a variety of tools such as increased collection
and repayment incentives. However, the choice and success of various policy interventions
depends on the magnitude of the effect of moral hazard and whether the existing techniques
are effective. An important obstacle to empirical work is the supply side response that may
confound estimates of moral hazard. The complication is that default is an equilibrium out-
come due to both borrowers and the lender. Borrowers may be more likely to default on
larger loans, but the lender may could reduce this effect with greater collection intensity.
Policymakers and researchers that wish to understand the costs of asymmetric information
must isolate the borrower effect apart from the lender’s response.
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I examine these issues using data from a large Chinese lender that specializes in providing
unsecured cash loans to households and small businesses. I exploit a natural experiment
where borrower applications are randomly assigned to loan officers to accommodate potential
endogeneity in loan sizes. I separate the lender’s response by recognizing that the decision to
first become late on payments doesn’t include collection intensity, while the ultimate decision
to default incorporates collection. By comparing the causal effects from both outcomes, I
can isolate the effect of moral hazard on default. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first paper studying moral hazard in lending that accounts for this distinction.
Lending is a particularly important setting in which to study information asymmetries for
a number of reasons. One is that moral hazard result in credit constraints that can have
negative costs on borrowers as well as lenders. For example, Banerjee and Newman (1993)
find that a lack of credit could lead to poverty traps for borrowers, while Fan et al. (2013) and
Nanda (2008) show that financial constraints for commercial lending also negatively impact
firm entry, profit, and survival.53 Another important factor is the government’s involvement
and regulation in lending, screening, and collection practices. By understanding the costs of
asymmetric information, more effective policy interventions can be implemented.
Isolating the effect of moral hazard on default requires overcoming a number of obstacles
and places formidable demands on data. Loan decisions are frequently made after observing
borrower attributes that are uncodified and unavailable to the econometrician. This creates
an omitted variables problem leading to endogeneity of loan sizes. Estimation requires
exogenous variation in loan sizes for causal inference. I accomplish this by comparing the
53Karlan and Zinman (2010) and Morduch (1998) also find negative impacts on job retention, income, and
mental outlook from insufficient credit. However, the welfare effects are more ambiguous when examining
certain kinds of high APR loans in developed countries. For example, Melzer (2011) finds that use of US
payday lending leads to increased difficulty in repaying household bills.
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delinquency behavior of ex-ante identical borrowers who were randomly assigned to different
loan officers. Similar to Abrams et al. (2012) or Maestas et al. (2013) in studying judicial
sentencing disparities and disability benefits, idiosyncratic differences across loan officers lead
to quasi-experimental variation in loan amounts that is orthogonal to unobserved borrower
attributes.
However, these approaches may not account for collection strategies. For example, Dobbie
and Skiba (2013) find a negative effect of moral hazard on default in the market for payday
lending, which indicates that borrowers become less risky with increases in loan sizes. One
explanation is that borrowers are in fact riskier when given larger unsecured loans, but
the lender is able to attenuate its effects with greater collection intensity. My approach in
isolating the borrower’s moral hazard on default is to exploit the difference between late
payments and defaulted loans. The rationale is that the causal effect of loan size on default
pools two effects: increased borrower incentives to not repay and collection intensity, while
the effect of loan size on late payments only captures the former. Differencing the two gives
an estimate of each component.
The empirical strategy relies on rich data from a large Chinese lender. This dataset offers an
ideal setting to decompose the effect of moral hazard. The data features detail at the individ-
ual borrower level including all of the codified application variables available to the lender.
Observed borrower attributes include the approved loan amount, loan terms, demographics,
education, financial, credit reports, self-reported survey data, and also include home and
workplace inspection variables totaling over 250 covariates. I also observe the full repayment
stream including monthly payments, delinquencies, and penalty fees. The repayment data
pins down when borrowers first missed payments and when the lender ultimately wrote off
the loan through default.
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I preview some main results. First, I find a significant effect of moral hazard where borrowers
given a ¥1,000 larger loan are 1.5% more likely to be late on payments indicating that
borrowers become riskier in response to larger loan sizes. Second, the causal effect of loan
size on default indicates that borrowers given a ¥1,000 larger loan are only .5% more likely
to default. I attribute the difference to the lender’s collection intensity towards larger loans.
Ignoring this interaction leads to a much smaller effect of moral hazard. In the case where
borrowers may be accidentally late and would have repaid even in the absence of collection,
the 1.5% estimate can be considered an upper bound for the effect of moral hazard on
default since not all of those borrowers would have defaulted. Lastly, following the strategy
of Adams et al. (2009), I find that the borrowers actually approved for larger loans were
1.5% less likely to be late. This effect could be due to advantageous selection by borrowers
or effective underwriting by the lender. Together, the selection and incentive effects of loan
sizes leads to no correlation with delinquency.
This paper fits into a growing literature that attempts to identify the effect of moral hazard on
default in credit markets. These studies focus on different identification strategies to account
for the endogeneity of loan sizes. Dobbie and Skiba (2013) use a regression discontinuity
approach around loan eligibility cutoffs to find little evidence of moral hazard and potentially
even negative effects. Karlan and Zinman (2009) conduct a randomized field experiment
varying an offer rate to find strong evidence of the effects of moral hazard. Adams et al.
(2009) use a borrower’s self-selected down payment and extensive controls to account for
selection and find large effects of moral hazard. Gine et al. (2012) examine the effect of
a specific repayment incentive of fingerprinting on default and find that collection leads to
decreased moral hazard.
This paper contributes through a number of dimensions. The first is a research design not
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previously used in this literature that estimates a causal effect from idiosyncratic differences
in approved loan amounts across different loan officers. Additionally, I separate the supply
side collection response from the borrower’s moral hazard on default. This is related to a
large literature in healthcare that studies how medical utilization is a combined decision
by both the patient and the physician. Hu et al. (2014) and Ho and Pakes (2013) show
evidence that physicians’ prescribing and referring behavior changes in response to cost
sharing changes. By ignoring that healthcare utilization and loan default are equilibrium
outcomes, policy interventions could be misguided. The remaining sections are structured
as follows. Section 2 describes the data and context in more detail. Section 3 presents the
theoretical framework for moral hazard, while Section 4 shows the estimation strategy and
assumptions for identification. Section 5 discusses the results and possible confounds to
identification, and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Environment
I study a large Chinese lender with more than 40 sales branches located across the country.
One of the lender’s main products is unsecured cash loans to households and small busi-
nesses.54 The lender utilizes both automated credit scoring through proprietary technology
as well as subjective evaluation with manual loan officer screening. Loan officers make a
loan amount decision given a holistic reading of the credit score and other uncodified data.55
Approved loan sizes are significantly higher than the microloans studied in the development
54In many parts of the developing world including China, the formal differences between small businesses
and households are small. Morduch (1998) finds that small business loans are often used for consumption
smoothing as well as investment purchases. The lender’s underwriting procedures between the two segments
is similar. Lending to state owned enterprises and large firms is primarily handled by traditional banks.
55Wang (2014b) study the loan officer’s decisions and finds that subjective screening adds considerable
value to automated credit scoring.
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literature and are slightly less than half of the average borrower’s salary income on average.
Self-reported loan purposes range from weddings to home appliances to restaurant furnishings
and office supplies. The borrowing population is not financially at-risk or subprime, and has
access to other financing options such as credit cards, home and vehicle loans, and other
cash-based lenders.56 The credit card market in China is characterized by low rates of
merchant take-up and high transaction fees. As a result, there has been a large growth in
popularity of cash-based lending in China in recent years. See Ayyagari et al. (2010) for a
more detailed survey of the Chinese financing industry.
2.2.1 Data
Table (2.7) presents some summary statistics for the data. The data period covers all loans
made from December 2011 to January 2014 and includes 31,954 borrowers with application
and repayment data. Because some loans have not yet completed, the repayment data is
censored for about 22,000 borrowers. I discuss methods to accommodate data censoring
in the empirical section. Average loan sizes are about ¥33,450, which is roughly $5,400 at
current exchange rates. These loan amounts are substantial both in absolute terms and as
a proportion of the average salary income of ¥71,000.57
56Broecker (1990) finds that competition among different lenders could decrease the average credit-
worthiness of a lender’s portfolio through adverse selection. In this environment, this adverse selection
on observable characteristics concern is somewhat alleviated by extensive information reporting. Applica-
tions to different lenders and outstanding loans are reported to credit monitoring agencies. Some of the
additional reported information include credit card usage and limits, external loan terms, and historical
repayment schedules.
57Beyond direct deposited salary income, the lender counts many sources of additional income such as non-
deposited salary, social security payments, business income, housing assistance, tax payments, and others.
Detailed asset information such as housing, vehicles, and insurance policies are also collected to estimate
net worth. There is also separate income accounting for certain worker types such as specialized employees
or government workers whose primary compensation may be through reimbursement and payment in kind.
The result is that individuals with low amounts of stated payroll may still have large sources of income. For
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics
Mean Min Max Std dev
Loan terms
Loan amount (¥000’s) 33 5 60 12
Requested (¥000’s) 124 3 300 103
Monthly payment (¥000’s) 2.2 0.3 5.7 1.1
Payment length (Months) 25 12 36 7
APR (%) 48% 33% 62% 7%
Borrower attributes
Estimated assets (¥000’s) 587 1 7,358 1,337
Salary income (¥000’s) 71 4 642 267
External debt (¥000’s) 160 0 1,923 856
Age 38 18 58 9
Credit card utilization 41% 0% 100% 38%
Credit card limit (¥000’s) 20 0 718 156
Proportion with credit card 76%
Proportion female 28%
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan
amount with a set APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the
loan officers. APR is inclusive of application fees. Financial variables are from verified credit
reports. Estimated assets include non-payroll sources, social security payments, vehicle and
other durable goods as well as business income. Debt is the sum of the external debt load
including credit, housing, and auto loans as identified by a credit report. As of August 2014,
$1 is ¥6.18.
Each loan is advertised with an APR and payment length, and different products are offered
across locations based on the local competitive landscape. New products are introduced and
retired frequently at each of the various locations. Loan term lengths range from 12 to 36
months with the median at 24 months. The most common loan in my sample is a 24-month
fixed payment loan with an APR of 48%. This APR includes the nominal interest rate,
application fees, and maintenance fees.58
comparison, per capita GDP in Shanghai is ¥82,000, and is ¥38,000 in China as a whole.
58Karlan and Zinman (2009) examine a similarly positioned unsecured cash-based lender in South Africa
and find APR rates of over 200%. The overall default rate for the South African lender is 30% for first time
borrowers. The studied lender’s overall default rate is less than 10%. The average APR for US credit cards
is around 10-15% and may be much higher for payday cash loans.
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2.2.2 Credit scoring and manual screening
The borrower’s first step is to fill out a loan application which includes identification, de-
mographics, financial documents, and verified references. Some of the self-reported data
include the purpose of the loan and the amount that the borrower is requesting. Following
submission, local branch employees verify the borrower’s income, debt, and asset information
using bank statements and credit reports. The branch employees will also make home and
workplace inspections to assess the borrower’s home environment. The application process
collects a large amount of information both codified and subjective. Survey information is
collected on the number of TV sets, air conditioning units, square footage, number of family
members, and others which are photographed and detailed in notes.
Codified information is entered into the lender’s proprietary credit scoring model. Some
examples include age, income, occupation, number of TV sets, and the square footage of the
borrower’s home. I also include the outcome of the lender’s credit scoring model, which is a
variable called credit quality that is an aggregation of a large amount of borrower attributes.
The uncodified subjective data is used by loan officers to holistically screen borrowers and
determine risk in conjunction with the objective information. This includes written notes,
photographs, or local knowledge about a borrower’s purchasing habits from bank statements.
Differences in how loan officers process this kind of information lead to variation in loan
decisions.
Once the branch employees gather the information from interviews and inspections, the
application is approved or denied by a local branch supervisor. Approved applications are
sent to the central headquarters where loan officers will screen the loan and choose the
approved loan size. Due to incomplete reporting standards from the different sales offices,
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I do not have information on rejections that happen before reaching central headquarters.
The separation of the extensive and intensive margins on loan sizes is a unique feature in this
setting. One reason that the lender gives in separating authority is to minimize the potential
costs of side payments at the branch level. There is no face to face contact between loan
officers and the borrowers although it is possible for the loan officers to contact borrowers
through other channels.
Once the central headquarters receives the application, it is randomly assigned to one of 21
loan officers for processing. In practice, a batch of applications will enter the office and be
distributed to loan officers without presorting.59 This assignment procedure will be crucial
in identification of the borrower’s moral hazard on default, which guarantees that each loan
officer’s portfolio of borrowers has the same ex-ante distribution of subjective uncodified
attributes. Idiosyncratic differences in how loan officers screen and make loan decisions
provides exogenous variation in loan sizes. Loan officers process roughly 700 applications a
year with the average file taking 30 to 40 minutes. Section 3 discusses this random assignment
and the necessary assumptions in more detail. During screening, the loan officer observes
all of the codified attributes including the borrower’s credit quality as well as the uncodified
subjective data such as photographs or notes.
After screening, the loan officer chooses a loan amount given the interest rate and payment
length.60 I stress that the only lever that the loan officers have in adjusting the terms of the
59Some loan products such as high net worth lending, college credit, or rapid turnaround loans do have
specialized loan officers for screening. The underwriting teams for various products will have specific expe-
rience and training that is tailored for their loan products. For the unsecured cash loans considered here, no
additional specialization occurs during distribution.
60While there is no explicit upper bound on loan size, the highest value I observe is ¥60,000. Loan officers
may need to acquire supervisor approval for very large loan amounts although the exact threshold is not a
codified rule. Ghosh et al. (2013) examine delegated pricing authority and find that the amount of authority
available to the agent depends on the agent’s local knowledge.
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loan is in choosing the size. The other loan terms including the interest rate and payment
length are fixed. Once the determination is complete, the borrower may sign the terms of
the loan with no further recourse for adjustment. The sales offices themselves play no part
in adjusting loan terms. The entire process from initial application to loan disbursement can
take between 3 to 7 days.
2.2.3 Requested amount
One unique feature of the application is that borrowers are asked to report a requested
loan amount. If the loan officer’s chosen loan size is larger than the borrower’s requested
amount, then the full amount requested is approved. If the approved loan amount is less
than the requested, then the borrower is underfunded and credit constrained. The lender’s
stated goal is to choose loan amounts based on the borrower’s repayment ability rather than
trying to satisfy borrower liquidity demands. This allocation mechanism mitigates the effect
of adverse selection where borrowers with an ex-ante higher likelihood of delinquency may
request larger loan sizes in anticipation. In this setting, loan officers are able to directly
condition on the borrower’s requested amount when making their decisions to potentially
mitigate any selection effects. To the extent there is any cross-sectional relationship between
self-reported requested amounts and defaults, then the correlation can be accounted for
similarly to the borrower’s other attributes such as income.
Another important point is that this requested amount may not represent a borrower’s true
underlying demand for loans, and there may be a signaling or strategic mechanism involved
in the decision. Table (2.7) shows that the requested loan amount is generally three times
the approved amount with a large amount of variation. Figure (2.2.1) shows the average
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Figure 2.2.1: Loan amounts and requested amounts by credit quality
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Riskier <=          Credit Quality          => Safer
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan
amount with a set APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the
loan officers. Borrower applications are randomly assigned to loan officers. Credit quality
is an internal measure of borrower quality from credit scoring - higher values indicate safer
borrowers. For each level of credit quality, the average loan amount and requested amount
is averaged over a bandwidth interval of 5.5 units of credit quality. As of August 2014, $1 is
¥6.18.
requested amount and approved amount for loans by credit quality, which is an internal
measure of borrower quality from credit scoring. Higher values of credit quality indicate
safer borrowers. The graph shows large and persistent differences between the amount that
is requested and the amount that is funded.61 Over 90% of borrowers were approved for loan
amounts smaller than requested.
61The slope of credit quality on the approved amount is positive and significant, which is difficult to see
at the scale of the graph.
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2.2.4 Repayment incentives
Borrowers are late when their payment is not received by their due date. Accounts delinquent
for more than 90 days or 3 payment periods are in default, and generally packaged and sold
to external collectors or written off. To prevent default, the lender utilizes a variety of tools
to mitigate moral hazard and incentivize repayment. Subsequent loans may come with more
attractive terms including lower fees and reduced APR. Additional carrots also come from
higher future loan amounts and a simpler approval process.62 The lender also uses sticks to
deter default, some of which scale with loan size and some that do not.
As soon as borrowers are late, automated messages and recorded calls are placed to the
borrower. The deterrence effect of these collection practices do not scale with the size of
the loan. However, some of the lender’s tools do rise in intensity with loan sizes. After
3 days of missed payments, the lender begins charging penalty fees and the borrower is
considered in arrears. Further actions include reporting to credit agencies and collection
calls by collectors. The intensity of some of these actions rises with the size of the loan. For
example, larger loans receive additional scrutiny by the collections department with a greater
frequency of collection calls, a higher chance of litigation, and a smaller chance to be written
off.63 Because the collections team is rewarded both on the number of loans recovered as well
as the total amount, collectors also may exert greater effort when contacting the borrower.
Many collectors will call family members and friends to exert additional repayment pressure.
The calls, notices, and collection intensity is not observed, but it is possible to see their
impact on repayment patterns. The loan officer has no contact with the borrower after loan
62This lender was established in the last 4 years and over 98% of loans are made to first-time borrowers.
Because secondary loans may come with additional information, I restrict all of my analysis to a borrower’s
first loan.
63For especially egregious borrowers who are late on large payments, their names are published in city
newspapers and along public corridors to increase social stigma and incentivize repayment.
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origination and the loan officer is not involved in collecting delinquent loans.
2.3 Framework
The goal of this study is to examine the degree of moral hazard present. Moral hazard
directly increases the incentives to default from higher loan sizes, while collection intensity
may alter the repayment decision. Separating these two effects is difficult because both lead
to a correlation between loan sizes and delinquency. Default could be due to factors directly
under the borrower’s control as well as environmental factors where the borrower has little
volition. The channel could be through strategic default where all else equal, borrowers
are more likely to walk away from repayment and declare bankruptcy for larger loans. The
mechanism could also be entirely outside of the borrower’s control such as higher monthly
payments pushing a borrower into default given stochastic shocks to income.
The causal effect could also be negatively related to risk. For some borrowers, increasing
returns from loan sizes may actually decrease the probability of default although the joint
correlation has to be weakly positive for equilibrium credit constraints Dobbie and Skiba
(2013). Both the sign and magnitude therefore depend on the concavity of the returns
from loan sizes versus the costs of default. Another effect that changes with the size of the
loan is collection efforts. Without accounting for this supply side response, any estimate
of the causal effect pools the effects of moral hazard and collection intensity. For late
loans, the lender could exert greater effort on collecting larger loans which attenuates the
effects of moral hazard. On the other hand, the lender could also engage in the inverse
strategy and exert greater effort in collecting smaller loans. The reasoning could be that
larger loans are easier to sell to third party collection agencies. This strategy would actually
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upward bias estimates of the effects of moral hazard on default because the data would
exhibit more defaults for larger loans. The goal of the empirical section is to examine the
relationship between loan amounts and delinquency and separate moral hazard from the
lender’s collection intensity.
2.4 Empirical strategy
The first step is to specify an empirical model of default.
Di = γLij +x
′
iΓ+ i (2.4.1)
Di is a 0/1 indicator for a delinquency event such as late payments or default, Lij is the
loan size chosen by loan officer j for borrower i, xi is a vector of borrower attributes and
loan terms including self-reported items, and i is a stochastic shock that is observed to loan
officers but not to the econometrician.
The moral hazard parameter of interest is γ, which is the direct causal effect of loan size
on the chance of delinquency. Larger values of γ mean that borrowers respond to larger
loan sizes by becoming more risky and more likely to default. Identifying the causal effect is
challenging because loan amounts are not randomly assigned. Lij is decided in combination
with the borrowers requested amount and the loan officer’s decisions. This means that Lij
and i may be correlated because Lij is decided after screening i, which indicates that the
unobserved attributes are not mean zero E [i|Lij ,xi, qi] 6= 0.
Following Adams et al. (2009), γ in equation (2.4.1) without controlling for endogeneity
pools two effects. One is the causal effect, and the other is the correlation between loan
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amounts and delinquency induced by selection and matching. If the correlation is positive,
then it indicates either advantageous selection by borrowers for loan sizes or the lender is
able to match larger loans to safer borrowers.64 This leads to a downward bias for γ if
endogeneity is not taken into account. With a suitable instrument, then comparing the OLS
and IV estimates of γ returns both the causal effect and the aggregate loan selection factors.
Fortunately, the random assignment of borrower applications to loan officers provides such
an instrument.
2.4.1 Endogeneity
Without an instrument, Lij is endogenous and correlated with the unobserved i. One solu-
tion to identifying the causal effect is to use the random assignment of borrower applications
to loan officers as exogenous variation in loan amounts. The intuition is that observably
identical borrowers are assigned to different loan officers with different propensities for ap-
proving loan sizes. Idiosyncratic differences in how loan officers screen, process, and approve
borrowers are assumed to be orthogonal to each borrower’s unobserved shock to repayment
i. This suggests that the loan officer’s average approved loan amount is a strong candidate
for an instrument.
With an instrument, average differences in delinquency across loan officers can be causally
attributed to differences in their average loan amount. The identifying assumption is that i
cannot be correlated with the loan officer’s average loan amount conditional on observable
borrower attributes.65 This assumption is supported by the random assignment of borrower
64These two mechanisms are not separated given this data. In the Adams et al. (2009) setting, this is
also a concern as individual salespeople may steer certain types of borrowers to different kinds of products
irrespective of their own selection.
65One possible violation is if loan officers collaborate with each other. For example, a loan officer on
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Table 2.8: First stage
Dependent variable: loan amount
MeanLoanitj 0.261*** 0.252*** 0.257*** 0.239*** 0.252***
(0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0403) (0.0407) (0.0398)
R2 0.369 0.415 0.435 0.477 0.520
Number of controls 78 84 85 129 265
Year by month, city, product X X X X X
Application variables X X X X
Internal credit quality X X X
Financial variables X X
Inspection variables X
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Table shows the first stage
between the loan officer’s average decision and loan sizes. MeanLoanij is the loan officer’s




Application variables include loan amount requested, loan purpose, and transformations.
Internal credit quality is an internal measure of borrower quality from credit scoring. Fi-
nancial variables include income, wealth, taxes, social security, credit reports, external debt,
and transformations. Inspection variables include home financing, home living arrangement,
extensive occupation details, home furnishing, tenure in workplace, payment length dum-
mies, and others. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18. Standard errors are clustered at the loan
officer level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
applications to loan officers. And because loan officers are not involved in collecting delin-
quent loans, there is an exclusion restriction. Loan collection is handled entirely by the local
branch offices and external collectors with no contact from the original loan officer. The only
effect that loan officers have on delinquency is through the choice of loan size.
Following Maestas et al. (2013), a candidate for an instrument is the loan officer’s average
loan amount within a month window.66 The average loan amount can be constructed to
a particularly hard to read application may consult with others. The data does not allow me to identify
collaboration in this way, but the large workload precludes this type of joint inspection from frequently
happening.
66This allows loan officers to change their lending behavior month to month. The variation comes from
shocks to their lending preferences across months.
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where Ntj is the loan officer’s total number of cases within a month window. This instrument
by construction cannot be correlated with the borrower specific portion of i. Any potential
endogeneity comes from factors within i that are correlated across borrowers. The intuition
for this instrument can be seen in figure (2.4.1), which plots the average loan amount for
two different loan officers for all of their loans against credit quality. Credit quality is the
lender’s internal measure of borrower risk and is an aggregation of a large amount of codified
borrower attributes. Despite borrower applications being randomly assigned across loan
officers, Officer B still approves a smaller loan amount at every level of risk.
Table (2.8) is the first stage of the approved loan size on this instrument. The Z-score around
6 across specifications supports the rank assumption that MeanLoanitj has sufficient corre-
lation with the the borrower’s approved loan amount. Despite including hundreds of controls
accounting for year by month effects, city controls, application variables, and extensive fi-
nancial and inspections variables, MeanLoanitj is still highly predictive of loan sizes due to
idiosyncratic differences in screening, processing, and approving borrowers. Significance still
holds whether the errors are clustered at the loan officer or loan officer month level.
Furthermore, it is not necessary that the assignment be unconditionally random. The iden-
tification assumption is still valid as long as the borrowers are randomly assigned conditional
on the observed hard information. Loan officers may specialize in borrowers from specific
cities or time windows, but they cannot specialize in cases with particularly high or low
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Figure 2.4.1: Average loan amount by credit quality
24 month loans at 48% APR from June 2012
Officer A Mean Loan
Officer B Mean Loan


















15 33 51 69 87 105
Riskier <=          Credit Quality          => Safer
Notes: Sample includes 282 first-time borrowers from June 2012 borrowing a 24 month
loan with an APR of 48%. Borrowers apply for a loan amount with a set APR and payment
length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the loan officers. Borrower applications are
randomly assigned to loan officers. Credit quality is an internal measure of borrower quality
from credit scoring - higher values indicate safer borrowers. For each level of credit quality,
the loan officer’s average loan amount is averaged over a bandwidth interval of 5.5. As of
August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18.
values of i within those categories.67 This assumption can be examined with a test for
correlated observables. The rationale is that if observable attributes are not correlated with
a loan officer’s portfolio, than it is less likely that unobservable attributes are correlated.
When examining the approval rates for disability examiners, Maestas et al. (2013) suggest
67Given the volume of cases, it would be difficult and impractical for a pre-screener to give the borrowers
with lower than expected ui to certain loan officers. The lender asserts that applications are not pre-sorted
beyond time and city. This is because loan officers do not all work at the same time and applications from
the same branch office may be frequently batched together. The lender does rely on separate underwriting
departments for its other products such as high net worth loans or college loans.
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such a test. By examining the regression of Lij on MeanLoanitj along with additional
covariates, I can test for correlated observables. This is because only borrower attributes that
are correlated with MeanLoanitj should change its coefficient when added to the regression.
The stable values across specifications in table (2.8) provide evidence that loan officers do
not specialize in observed borrower types beyond time and city. Extending the logic, this
also supports the assumption that loan officers do not specialize within observed borrower
types either.
2.4.2 Separating moral hazard and collection intensity
After accounting for endogeneity, there is an additional difficulty in estimating γ. The causal
effect itself is a composite of both the borrower’s increased moral hazard and the lender’s
increased collection intensity. Even without any moral hazard, there could be a relationship
between default and loan size if the lender exerts differential collection intensity towards
larger loans. The direction of the bias depends on the lender’s strategic choice of collection
and is not ex-ante obvious. Collection activities that are invariant to the size of the loan
will not bias γ and instead be subsumed into the constant term. Only collection efforts that
rise or fall with the size of the loan will confound estimates of γ. I account for the lender’s
response by relying on the distinction between late loans versus defaulted loans.
As soon as a payment is overdue, automated messages are placed to the borrower. These
collection efforts continue and are invariant to the amount in arrears until the third day, at
which point the penalty grace period expires. From this point, fees are levied and a series of
collection efforts including calls to family members, friends, and other references will follow.
Depending on the amount of time delinquent, collection visits may occur. These calls and
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0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Maximum days late by borrower
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Emails and automated reminder
calls are placed as soon as the borrower is late, but penalty interest does not begin until the
borrower is three days past due. Once this occurs, collection agents contact the borrower to
encourage repayment. Borrowers late by more than 30 days are aggregated to 30. Loans are
written off and in default past 90 days overdue.
visits escalate in frequency given time and the repayment outstanding. The lender also
employs newspapers and billboards to advertise certain delinquent borrowers to the public.
After 90 days overdue, the loans are usually written off and sold to external collectors or
referred to litigation. Figure (2.4.2) shows a histogram of the number of days late conditional
on a borrower being late. Many late borrowers are converted back to their payment schedules
throughout the delinquency period as the lender exerts collection efforts. I define late loans
as three days past due to separate collection that is invariant to loan size and collection that
may scale with the loan.
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The borrower’s increased risk results in more borrowers becoming late on payments, but ul-
timately, the lender can convert many late borrowers back to their regular payment schedule.
γ in equation (2.4.1) where late payments is the outcome variable includes only the effect of
moral hazard on default, while γ in equation (2.4.1) with default as the outcome also pools
the collection intensity. The identifying assumption is that late borrowers would not have
repaid their loans absent collection notices. If this assumption holds, then the causal effect
of increased loan size on late payments is the moral hazard effect.
One potential confound is that some borrowers are late by accident and would not have
defaulted even without reminders from the lender. Two institutional features address this
concern. One is that the three day grace period gives borrowers time to submit payments
that were missed on accident. The other is that all of the payments for all borrowers are
directly debited from the borrower’s bank account with no need for physical mailing of
the monthly payment. The borrower’s primary bank account must have low funds for the
borrower to be overdue. These two features decrease the probability that late payments
are unplanned. The histogram in Figure (2.4.2) shows that many borrowers repay their
loans within the first three days. Longer lasting delinquent borrowers are likely to not be
accidental. It may also be possible that borrowers are late strategically in order to repay at
a later date. This could be due to liquidity constraints or pay cycles that are not matched
to the loan’s payment dates. Due to late penalty fees, it is unlikely that this is a profitable
strategy for the borrower. The late fees would be higher than the interest on an additional
loan covering the missed payment. To the extent that borrowers may default for these other
reasons, then the estimate of moral hazard can be considered an upper bound since some
portion of delinquent borrowers might still have been accidental.
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2.4.3 Empirical default model
I use the probit specification as the main model of delinquency risk. I account for endogeneity
by instrumenting for Lij using MeanLoanitj and the full set of exogenous regressors Zitj =








Lij = βZitj +υi (2.4.4)
where Di is in indicator for delinquency such as late payments or default. The two equations
are estimated jointly using maximum likelihood.
Another hurdle is censoring in the repayment variable because many of the outstanding
loans have not yet completed by the end of the study period. The data include 26 months
of loans from 2011 to 2014 where the most common loan has a term length of 24 months.
I have repayment data for those loans through 2014, and observe roughly 7,000 completed
loans. I account for this by including extensive controls on the number of payments com-
pleted, payments remaining, and the proportion of payments completed into the borrower’s
observed attributes xi. I perform three different robustness checks on the sensitivity of re-
sults to censoring. One methodology only estimates on the full sample of uncensored loans,
and another method also includes all completed and defaulted.68 I also estimate with a
Cox proportional hazard model, which can directly account for censoring by modeling the
instantaneous probability of default.
The Cox proportional hazards model exhibits a number of attractive features. The model is
68An uncensored loan is one in which I have observed the total number of repayment periods. A loan
completed early 3 months into a 24 month payment term would only be uncensored if I observed all 24
payment periods.
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flexible, semi-parametric, and is able to handle data censoring. The model specifies that the
instantaneous probability of delinquency at time t conditional on the loan surviving until






. This hazard rate is composed of two
parts: an unparametrized baseline rate that is allowed to vary flexibly, and a proportional
hazard component that shifts the overall hazard rate multiplicatively. Because payment
length varies considerably in the sample from a low of 12 months to a high of 36 months,
time is cast as the percentage of loan payments made instead of calender time. For example,
t= 0 would be the start of the loan, t= .5 would be 50% of payments made, and t= 1 would
be full completion.
While the Cox model can accommodate censoring, it suffers from a number of weaknesses.
The required assumption is that changes in the proportional hazard shift the baseline multi-
plicatively and have no other impact on the baseline. This is a strong assumption not present
in the linear probability model or the probit. In addition, accounting for endogeneity is more
difficult. Since the Cox model is non-linear, standard methods for implementing instrumental
variables are not as efficient as a control function approach Wooldridge and Imbens (2007).
Estimation follows a two-step control function procedure. In the first step, Lij is regressed
on the exogenous covariates and the instrumentMeanLoanitj . The predicted residuals from
this first stage are entered linearly into the Cox model as another explanatory variable in
the likelihood function. The reasoning of the control function is that the predicted residual
controls for the portion of Lij that is correlated with the endogenous errors. By including the
control function, the remaining variation in Lij can be considered orthogonal to the error.
81
2.5 Results
Table (2.9) shows the estimates for the probit model. The displayed coefficients are marginal
effects on the probability of the delinquency outcome with all covariates set to their mean
values. Column (1) displays the regression without controlling for the endogeneity of loan
sizes. Column (2) usesMeanLoanitj as an instrument for loan sizes with late payment as the
outcome, and column (3) uses default as the delinquency outcome. Without an instrument,
column (1) indicates that higher loan amounts lead to a small and statistically insignificant
causal effect on the chance of a late payment. This effect is biased because the borrowers
given larger loans may be safer (or riskier) than their peers all else equal.
Column (2) displays the effect of moral hazard on late payments controlling for the endo-
geneity of loan sizes with MeanLoanitj as an instrument. The estimate can be interpreted
as a ¥1,000 increase in loan amounts leads to a 1.5% higher chance of a loan being late.
However, when examining defaults, the effect is substantially smaller. Column (3) shows the
effect on default indicating that a ¥1,000 higher loan amount increases the chance of default
by .5%. If the lender exerted the same collection intensity to all loans, then there should be
no difference in the two estimates. If the lender instead favored collecting smaller loans, then
the coefficient in column (3) may even be larger than column (2). The coefficients indicate
that the lender is increasing collection intensity on larger loans which conforms with the
lender’s stated procedures. One potential confound may be that borrowers are late acciden-
tally and do not intend to default even without any collection. If these borrowers are still
late despite the 3 day grace period and large penalty fees, then the moral hazard effect may
be upward biased. In other words, this may be an upper bound.
The estimate can be compared to the literature, although the comparison is again not
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straightforward since differences in institutional setting make cross-country comparisons dif-
ficult. Despite the difficulties, the estimates are roughly consistent. In the US subprime auto
financing market, Adams et al. (2009) find that a 1% increase in loan amounts leads to a
1.6% increase in the chance of default. Other estimates find either very small or sometimes
positive magnitudes. Dobbie and Skiba (2013) find that increases in loan size lead to a slight
decrease in default when examining US payday lenders. One possible interpretation of this
result is that the authors are instead examining the composite causal effect including col-
lection. Payday lenders may be effective at convincing late borrowers to resume repayment
and avoid default.
Some of the other borrower attributes are also of interest. Column (2) shows that borrowers
that ask for more, don’t have credit cards, regular employees, or males are all riskier than
their counterparts. Older borrowers also become delinquent at greater rates. The difference
between column (2) and column (3) shows that some borrower types respond to collection
differently than others. For example, while females are less likely to become late, they seem
to respond less to collection than males. This could be because females are less susceptible to
social pressures or that collection agents use comparatively lighter methods to collect from
females. One added difficulty in interpreting some borrower attributes is that the lender’s
internal measure of risk is already an aggregation of many borrower types such as income.
Adams et al. (2009) note that the cross sectional correlation in column (1) includes both the
causal effect and the loan assignment process. This assignment includes both the borrower’s
selection and the lender’s approval effects. Borrowers demand loans for many reasons such as
true liquidity demand, anticipated moral hazard Einav et al. (2013a), strategic signaling, or
cheap talk. The lender approves loan sizes due to the screening decisions of their loan officers
given the amount that borrowers request so that loan assignment includes both factors. By
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subtracting the causal effect from column (1), I can recover a measure of the aggregate se-
lection effects. Differencing column (2) from (1) indicates that borrowers receiving a ¥1,000
loan were 1.5% less likely to become late on payments. This indicates an advantageous selec-
tion either caused by the safer borrowers demanding larger loans or the lender’s underwriting
efforts approving safer borrowers to larger loans. The exact mechanism is not pinned down
with this data due to possible strategic action on the borrower’s requested amount.
2.5.1 Robustness
Alternative specifications also support the estimates from the probit model. Table (2.10)
uses the linear probability model and displays similar results. Column (2) estimates with
MeanLoanitj as an instrument using 2SLS to find that a ¥1,000 causally increases late
payments by 1.5%. Using an alternative measure for late payments, column (4) finds that the
total number of late periods is also increasing with the size of the loan. Note that continuous
late periods past three months results in default. Column (5) finds that if collection efforts
are included, then the marginal effect is mitigated to .8%. This is consistent with the
main results suggesting that collection can attenuate the effects of moral hazard on default.
Differencing column (2) from (1) or differencing column (4) from (3) also shows that loan
sizes are advantageously selected and given to safer borrowers.
Table (2.11) displays alternative specifications to examine censoring in the data. The top
panel shows the probit model estimated off of only uncensored loans. Uncensored loans are
those for which the full number of repayment months has been observed regardless of the loan
status. With 3,799 uncensored observations, column (2) gives an estimate of 1.7% which is
reduced to a statistically insignificant 1% when examining default as the outcome. Compared
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to column (1), the borrowers given larger loans still indicate advantageous selection. This
pattern is repeated when examining uncensored, defaulted, and completed loans in the middle
panel. The estimate in column (5) is mitigated in column (6) although the two values
are much closer. This is most likely due to the sample selection issues of over-sampling
from defaulted loans and selecting on the left hand side variable. The last panel shows
the Cox proportional hazard model which directly accounts for censoring by modeling the
instantaneous delinquency risk using survival methods. The hazard ratios show that a ¥1,000
larger loan leads to a 10% greater chance of late payments, and only a 8% chance of default.
There is still evidence of advantageous selection when compared to column (7). While the
direction of the effects is comparable, the difference in magnitude could be due to the more
restrictive parametric assumptions of the Cox model.
The additional evidence conforms with the probit that borrowers become riskier when given
larger loans, but the effect is attenuated by the lender so that many delinquent borrowers
resume repayment. Additionally, the cross-sectional correlation between loan sizes and late
payments is uniformly smaller than the causal effect across all specifications. Loan assign-
ment seems to be advantageous where safer borrowers are given larger loans. This could be
due to safer borrowers demanding larger loans or effective underwriting mechanisms leading
to good matches.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented evidence of private information operating through moral haz-
ard. I identified the effect of moral hazard on default by relying on exogenous variation in
loan sizes due to the random assignment of borrower applications to loan officers. Idiosyn-
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cratic differences in how loan officers screen, process, and approve borrowers led to variation
in average loan amounts. This exogenous variation identified the causal impact of larger loan
amounts on delinquency. By exploiting the differences between late and defaulted loans, I
also accounted for the effectiveness of the lender’s collection intensity towards larger loans.
The rationale is that the causal effect of loan size on default includes two effects: increased
moral hazard on default and increased collection. However, the causal effect of loan size
on late loans only captures the former. By differencing the two specifications, I can get an
estimate of the component pieces. I found that although borrowers given larger loans are
1.5% more likely to become late, that effect decreases to .5% when examining defaults. I
concluded that greater collection effort may have been effective at reducing this tendency.
These results highlight the difficulty of evaluating costs in other markets as well. For ex-
ample, increased healthcare utilization observed in aggregate data is a joint decision that is
driven by both the patient and the physician. There may be a bias in estimates without ac-
counting for the confounding supply side response. Another important insight is that private
information may be mitigated with the tools identified by theory. Given the prevalence of
markets featuring moral hazard, these results speak to the benefits of increased information
screening and greater dynamic incentives. Automated credit scoring, manual loan officer
screening, and rising collection intensity are largely able to offset many of the costs of asym-
metric information. A better understanding of how these mechanisms actually mitigate is
an important area for future research.
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Table 2.9: Effect of loan size on delinquency with probit
(1) (2) (3)
Probit Probit with IV Probit with IV
Late indicator Late indicator Default indicator
Loan size (000’s) 0.000421 0.0150*** 0.00454**
(0.000295) (0.00364) (0.00223)
Requested (000’s) -4.27e-05 0.000184*** 3.92e-05
(2.74e-05) (6.69e-05) (3.35e-05)
Credit score -3.67e-05 -5.52e-05 -2.59e-05
(0.000208) (0.000218) (0.000121)
APR (%) -0.000895 0.285 0.228
(0.353) (0.358) (0.187)
Salary (000’s) 1.10e-06 -2.66e-05 -6.23e-06
(1.75e-05) (1.69e-05) (9.22e-06)
Credit card (1/0) -0.0165* -0.0248*** -0.0140***
(0.00918) (0.00937) (0.00537)
CC utilization (%) 0.0113 0.0198 0.00641
(0.0223) (0.0232) (0.0113)
Debt level (000’s) -3.48e-06 -6.61e-06 -1.70e-06
(3.58e-06) (4.05e-06) (1.77e-06)
Manager (1/0) 0.000491 -0.0322*** -0.00144
(0.00816) (0.0117) (0.00548)
Female (1/0) -0.0783*** -0.0765*** -0.0196***
(0.00606) (0.00614) (0.00365)
Homeowner (0/1) -0.0210* 0.00822 0.00761
(0.0118) (0.0140) (0.00767)
Age -0.00325*** -0.00359*** -0.00121***
(0.000771) (0.000773) (0.000448)
Observations 31,954 31,954 31,954
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014 across
more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Displayed coefficients for the probit
are marginal effects on the probability of the outcome with all covariates set to their mean
value. Additional controls include year by month, city, product fixed effects, and additional
application, financial, and inspection variables. Loans are late if payment is not received within
3 days after the due date. Loans are in default is payment is not received 90 days past the due
date. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.10: Effect of loan size on delinquency with linear probability model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Loan size (000’s) 0.000299 0.0146*** 0.000236 0.0454** 0.00763***
(0.000260) (0.00392) (0.00191) (0.0207) (0.00281)
Requested (000’s) -3.88e-05 0.000182*** -
0.000557***
0.000139 8.06e-05*
(2.38e-05) (6.89e-05) (0.000167) (0.000507) (4.49e-05)
Credit score 0.000121 0.000101 5.89e-05 -2.84e-06 0.000172
(0.000172) (0.000190) (0.00150) (0.00152) (0.000146)
APR (%) -0.442 -0.163 -6.698*** -5.819*** -0.333
(0.308) (0.333) (2.153) (2.211) (0.234)
Salary (000’s) 2.25e-06 -2.51e-05 0.000166 7.92e-05 -8.13e-06
(1.55e-05) (1.61e-05) (0.000157) (0.000162) (1.28e-05)
Credit card (1/0) -0.0126 -0.0213** -0.164** -0.192*** -0.0162**
(0.00796) (0.00854) (0.0663) (0.0684) (0.00641)
CC utilization (%) 0.0122 0.0206 -0.0324 -0.00599 0.0137
(0.0184) (0.0202) (0.147) (0.149) (0.0136)
Debt level (000’s) -1.76e-06 -4.98e-06** -1.90e-05** -2.92e-05** -2.13e-06
(1.32e-06) (2.52e-06) (8.11e-06) (1.36e-05) (1.44e-06)
Manager (1/0) 0.00355 -0.0280** -0.0523 -0.152* -0.00355
(0.00706) (0.0113) (0.0510) (0.0810) (0.00721)
Female (1/0) -0.0652*** -0.0665*** -0.425*** -0.429*** -0.0209***
(0.00524) (0.00546) (0.0436) (0.0441) (0.00370)
Homeowner (0/1) -0.0181* 0.00993 -0.112 -0.0236 0.0128
(0.0106) (0.0128) (0.0858) (0.104) (0.00906)
Age -0.00280*** -0.00327*** -0.0255*** -0.0270*** -0.00156***
(0.000650) (0.000681) (0.00566) (0.00568) (0.000525)
Observations 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014 across
more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Additional controls include year by month,
city, product fixed effects, and additional application, financial, and inspection variables. Loans
are late if payment is not received within 3 days after the due date. Loans are in default is
payment is not received 90 days past the due date. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18. Standard
errors are clustered at the loan officer level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.11: Effect of loan size on delinquency with alternative censoring
(1) (2) (3)




Loan size (000’s) -0.00142 0.0173** 0.0104
(0.000924) (0.00760) (0.00814)
Requested (000’s) -0.000233** 0.000199 7.92e-05
(9.91e-05) (0.000200) (0.000189)








Loan size (000’s) 0.000995 0.0284*** 0.0250***
(0.000844) (0.00446) (0.00554)
Requested (000’s) -0.000126 0.000428*** 0.000252
(9.61e-05) (0.000128) (0.000154)








Loan size (000’s) 1.004*** 1.107*** 1.082***
(0.00133) (0.0253) (0.0182)
Requested (000’s) 1.000** 1.001*** 1.001***
(0.000110) (0.000390) (0.000283)
Observations 31,954 31,954 31,954
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014 across
more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. “Uncensored loans” are loans where the
full payment term has been observed. “Uncensored, defaulted, & completed loans” are loans
that are uncensored, defaulted, or were completed early. The cox proportional hazard uses
MeanLoanitj as a control function to control for endogeneity. Displayed coefficients for the
probit are marginal effects on the probability of the outcome with all covariates set to their
mean value. Displayed coefficients for the Cox model are hazard ratios. Additional controls
include year by month, city, product fixed effects, and additional application, financial, and
inspection variables. Loans are late if payment is not received within 3 days after the due date.
Loans are in default is payment is not received 90 days past the due date. As of August 2014,
$1 is ¥6.18. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.





Social (peer) effects are a key factor in lending markets with effects on adoption, liability,
and repayment Breza (2013). Peer effects spread information about the costs and benefits
of loan default across borrowers. This could lead to updated perceptions about the ease of
default, the degree of stigma, or the burden of collection efforts among a borrower’s peer
group. Policymakers and researchers have long been interested in studying how interventions
targeting one borrower may causally affect his or her peers. Recognizing the importance of
information diffusion and social factors, many lenders take advantage of group liability and
social pressure to increase repayment Karlan and Gine (2007). The efficacy of different policy
prescriptions depends on the existence of peer effects and its empirical magnitude. However,
estimates of peer effects may capture many unrelated confounding factors.
Identifying peer effects involves formidable obstacles including endogenous group formation,
correlated unobservables, and reflection as highlighted by Manski (1993). These challenges
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make it difficult to separate peer effects without sufficiently rich data and sharp research
design. For example, peer groups may form based on unobservable factors that are correlated
with repayment behavior. This endogenous formation may result in group members that are
similar in unobserved ways and susceptible to the same delinquency patterns. Post group
formation, common shocks may also impact an entire peer group at once and directly change
the incentives for repayment. Furthermore, it is difficult to avoid a simultaneity problem
where members may also influence the group leading to a reflection effect. Policymakers
and researchers that wish to quantify the magnitude of peer effects must overcome these
challenges.
I study peer effects using data from a large Chinese lender that specializes in providing unse-
cured cash loans to households and small businesses. I rely on several attractive institutional
features for identification. These include the time difference between initial delinquency and
default; micro data that incorporates rich borrower attributes, workplace groups, and repay-
ment histories; and a natural experiment where borrower applications are randomly assigned.
I overcome the reflection problem by relying on the past number of defaults in a borrower’s
work group, which avoids issues of simultaneity because the past defaults of others are not
affected by the borrower’s current decision to repay. My methodology accounts for correlated
unobservables and endogenous group formation in two ways. One is with a large collection
of borrower attributes and fixed effects, and the other is an instrumental variables strategy
that provides exogenous variation in the chance of default.
To account for the endogeneity of the peer group’s default behavior, I rely on the random
assignment of borrower applications to loan officers. Loan officers using sophisticated un-
derwriting technologies and subjective interviews are able to screen borrowers and adjust
loan sizes. However, differences across loan officers in how they screen, process, and approve
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borrowers lead to exogenous differences in loan sizes and default risk for borrowers Wang
(2014a). By using the loan officer’s average loan sizes for other borrowers, I can instrument
for both the loan amount and the peer group’s default rate. Similar to Abrams et al. (2012)
or Maestas et al. (2013) in studying judicial sentencing disparities and disability benefits,
idiosyncratic differences across loan officers lead to quasi-experimental variation that is or-
thogonal to unobserved shocks. As an additional check against a weak instrument, I also
utilize an alternate approach with time varying fixed effects and find similar results.
The empirical strategy relies on rich data from a large Chinese lender. This dataset offers an
ideal setting to study peer effects. The data features detail at the individual borrower level
including all of the codified application variables available to the lender. Observed borrower
attributes include the approved loan amount, loan terms, demographics, education, financial,
credit reports, self-reported survey data, and also include home and workplace inspection
variables totaling over 250 covariates. I also observe the full repayment stream including
monthly payments, delinquencies, and penalty fees. The repayment data pins down when
borrowers first missed payments and when the lender ultimately wrote off the loan through
default 90 days later. I find large and consistent peer effects across an array of specifications.
I find that a coworker defaulting increases the chance of a late payment by 3.2%. This effect
increases as the coworker spends additional time in delinquency indicating that the strength
of the peer effect may rise over time.
Lending is a particularly important setting in which to study peer effects for a number of
reasons. One is that correlated defaults across borrowers may result in credit constraints
that can have negative costs on borrowers as well as lenders Karlan and Gine (2007). For
example, Banerjee and Newman (1993) find that a lack of credit could lead to poverty traps
for borrowers, while Fan et al. (2013) and Nanda (2008) show that financial constraints for
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commercial lending also negatively impact firm entry, profit, and survival.69 Peer effects
are also especially prominent in lending with correlated defaults found in mortgage markets
and microfinance Guiso et al. (2009). Another important factor is the widespread use of
repayment interventions that take advantage of social pressure such as group liability. By
understanding the nature of peer effects, more effective policy interventions can be imple-
mented and regulated.
This paper fits into a growing literature that attempts to study peer effects in credit markets.
These studies use different identification strategies to overcome empirical challenges. Breza
(2013) rely on different incentives to default based on payments remaining in the loan cycle
to find strong evidence of peer effects. Peers that move from full default to full repayment
increase the probability of repayment by 10 to 15 percentage points. Karlan and Gine (2007)
use a field experiment to modify liability from group to individual and find little effect of
group liability on repayment rates. However, they find simultaneous changes in loan sizes,
approval rates, and monitoring. Accounting for these corresponding changes in loan terms
is another unique challenge in lending. Guiso et al. (2009) use survey data to find that
borrowers are more likely to default on their mortgage payments if they know of someone
who has previously defaulted.
I contribute to this literature in a number of ways. First, I study a population that is
not financially at risk or subprime; this population is more representative of an average
borrower than the microloan borrowers studied in other contexts. Second, I employ a rich
dataset featuring extensive borrower attributes and repayment data. In contrast to other
69Karlan and Zinman (2010) and Morduch (1998) also find negative impacts on job retention, income, and
mental outlook from insufficient credit. However, the welfare effects are more ambiguous when examining
certain kinds of high APR loans in developed countries. For example, Melzer (2011) finds that use of US
payday lending leads to increased difficulty in repaying household bills.
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studies that use a historical group characteristic to account for simultaneity, I have access
to individual data to construct a measure of group delinquency that exclude the borrower.
Making this adjustment allows for consistent estimation even in the presence of fixed or
random effects Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). Lastly, I also account for the endogeneity
of loan sizes using instrumental variables. Allowing the individual loan amount to also be
endogenous is important because any instrument for group delinquency is likely to also be
correlated with individual loan sizes Angrist and Pischke (2009).
The remaining sections are structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and context
in more detail. Section 3 shows the estimation strategy and assumptions for identification.
Section 4 discusses the results and possible confounds to identification, and section 5 con-
cludes.
3.2 Environment
I study a large Chinese lender with more than 40 branches located across the country. One of
the lender’s main products is unsecured cash loans to households and small businesses.70 The
lender utilizes both automated credit scoring through proprietary underwriting technology
as well as subjective evaluation with manual loan officer screening. Loan officers make a
loan size decision given a holistic reading of the credit score and other uncodified data.71
Approved loan sizes are significantly higher than the microloans studied in the development
literature and are slightly less than half of the average borrower’s salary income on average.
70In many parts of the developing world including China, the formal differences between small businesses
and households are small. Morduch (1998) finds that small business loans are often used for consumption
smoothing as well as investment purchases. The lender’s underwriting procedures between the two segments
is similar. Lending to state owned enterprises and large firms is primarily handled by traditional banks.
71Wang (2014b) study the loan officer’s decisions and finds that subjective screening adds considerable
value to automated credit scoring alone.
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Self-reported loan purposes range from weddings to home appliances to restaurant furnishings
and office supplies. The borrowing population is not financially at-risk or subprime, and has
access to other financing options such as credit cards, home and vehicle loans, and other
cash-based lenders.72 The credit card market in China is characterized by low rates of
merchant take-up and high transaction fees. As a result, there has been a large growth in
popularity of cash-based lending in China in recent years. See Ayyagari et al. (2010) for a
more detailed survey of the Chinese financing industry.
3.2.1 Data
Table (3.12) presents some summary statistics for the data. The data period covers all loans
made from December 2011 to January 2014 and includes 31,954 borrowers with application
and repayment data. Estimation takes advantage of the panel nature of monthly payment
periods for a total of 445,093 observations. Average loan sizes are about ¥33,450, which
is roughly $5,400 at current exchange rates. These loan amounts are substantial both in
absolute terms and as a proportion of the average salary income of ¥71,000.73
Each loan is advertised with an APR and payment length, and different products are offered
across locations based on the local competitive landscape. New products are introduced and
72Broecker (1990) finds that competition among different lenders could decrease the average credit-
worthiness of a lender’s portfolio through adverse selection. In this environment, this concern is somewhat
alleviated by extensive information reporting. Applications to different lenders and outstanding loans are
reported to credit monitoring agencies. Some of the additional reported information include credit card
usage and limits, external loan terms, and historical repayment schedules.
73Beyond direct deposited salary income, the lender counts many sources of additional income such as non-
deposited salary, social security payments, business income, housing assistance, tax payments, and others.
Detailed asset information such as housing, vehicles, and insurance policies are also collected to estimate
net worth. There is also separate income accounting for certain worker types such as specialized employees
or government workers whose primary compensation may be through reimbursement and payment in kind.
The result is that individuals with low amounts of stated payroll may still have large sources of income. For
comparison, per capita GDP in Shanghai is ¥82,000, and is ¥38,000 in China as a whole.
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Table 3.12: Summary statistics
Mean Min Max Std dev
Loan terms
Loan amount (¥000’s) 33 5 60 12
Requested (¥000’s) 124 3 300 103
Monthly payment (¥000’s) 2.2 0.3 5.7 1.1
Payment length (Months) 25 12 36 7
APR (%) 48% 33% 62% 7%
Borrower attributes
Estimated assets (¥000’s) 587 1 7,358 1,337
Salary income (¥000’s) 71 4 642 267
External debt (¥000’s) 160 0 1,923 856
Age 38 18 58 9
Credit card utilization 41% 0% 100% 38%
Credit card limit (¥000’s) 20 0 718 156
Proportion with credit card 76%
Proportion female 28%
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Borrowers apply for a loan
amount with a set APR and payment length. Approved loan amounts are decided by the
loan officers. APR is inclusive of application fees. Financial variables are from verified credit
reports. Estimated assets include non-payroll sources, social security payments, vehicle and
other durable goods as well as business income. Debt is the sum of the external debt load
including credit, housing, and auto loans as identified by a credit report. As of August 2014,
$1 is ¥6.18.
retired frequently at each of the various locations. Loan term lengths range from 12 to 36
months with the median at 24 months. The most common loan in my sample is a 24-month
fixed payment loan with an APR of 48%. This APR includes the nominal interest rate,
application fees, and maintenance fees.74
3.2.2 Credit scoring and manual scoring
The borrower’s first step is to fill out a loan application which includes identification, de-
mographics, financial documents, and verified references. Some of the self-reported data
74Karlan and Zinman (2009) examine a similarly positioned unsecured cash-based lender in South Africa
and find APR rates of over 200%. The overall default rate for the South African lender is 30% for first time
borrowers. The studied lender’s overall default rate is less than 10%. The average APR for US credit cards
is around 10-15% and may be much higher for payday cash loans.
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include the purpose of the loan and the amount that the borrower is requesting. Following
submission, local branch employees verify the borrower’s income, debt, and asset information
using bank statements and credit reports. The branch employees will also make home and
workplace inspections to assess the borrower’s home environment. Survey information is
collected on the number of TV sets, air conditioning units, square footage, number of family
members, and others which are detailed in notes and photographs.
The application process collects a large amount of information both objective and subjective.
The difference is that objective data is codified while subjective data is uncodified or costly
to codify. Another important distinction is that all of the codified data is observable to
the econometrician while the uncodified data is only observable to the loan officers. I also
include the outcome of the lender’s credit scoring model, which is a variable called credit
quality that is an aggregation of a large amount of borrower attributes. The uncodified
subjective data is used by loan officers to holistically screen borrowers and determine risk
in conjunction with the objective information. This includes written notes, photographs, or
local knowledge about a borrower’s purchasing habits from bank statements. By reviewing
this type of information, loan officers can respond to shocks to repayment that are unobserved
to the econometrician.
Once the branch employees gather the information from interviews and inspections, the
application is approved or denied by a local branch supervisor. Approved applications are
sent to central headquarters where loan officers will screen the loan and choose the approved
loan size. Due to incomplete reporting standards from the different sales offices, I do not have
information on rejections that happen before reaching central headquarters. The separation
of the extensive and intensive margins on loan sizes is a unique feature in this setting. One
reason that the lender gives in separating authority is to minimize the potential costs of
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side payments at the branch level. There is no face to face contact between loan officers
and borrowers although it is possible for the loan officers to contact borrowers through other
channels.
Once the central headquarters receives the application, it is randomly assigned to one of 21
loan officers for processing. In practice, a batch of applications will enter the office and be
distributed to loan officers without presorting.75 This assignment procedure will be crucial
in identification of peer effects because it guarantees that each loan officer’s portfolio of
borrowers has the same ex-ante distribution of subjective uncodified attributes. Idiosyncratic
differences in how loan officers screen and make loan decisions provides exogenous variation
in both loan sizes and the probability of default. This latter mechanism is through a moral
hazard effect where greater loan amounts may causally increase the chance of strategic default
Adams et al. (2009). Loan officers process roughly 700 applications a year with the average
file taking 30 to 40 minutes.
After screening, the loan officer chooses a loan amount given the interest rate and payment
length.76 I stress that the only lever that the loan officers have in adjusting the terms of the
loan is in choosing the size. The other loan terms are fixed. Once the determination is com-
plete, the borrower may sign the terms of the loan with no further recourse for adjustment.
The sales offices themselves play no part in adjusting loan terms. The entire process from
initial application to loan disbursement can take between 3 to 7 days.
75Some loan products such as high net worth lending, college credit, or rapid turnaround loans do have
specialized loan officers for screening. The underwriting teams for various products will have specific expe-
rience and training that is tailored for their loan products. For the unsecured cash loans considered here, no
additional specialization occurs during distribution.
76While there is no explicit upper bound on loan size, the highest value I observe is ¥60,000. Loan officers
may need to acquire supervisor approval for very large loan amounts although the exact threshold is not a
codified rule. Ghosh et al. (2013) examine delegated pricing authority and find that the amount of authority
available to the agent depends on the agent’s local knowledge.
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3.2.3 Peer repayment incentives
Peer groups can be defined in a number of ways including self-reported, geographic proxim-
ity, social status, or workplace association. My data offers detailed information on the name
and address of the borrower’s workplace. By performing a match based on name, address,
and industry type, I am able to form over 2,000 workplace groups with more than one bor-
rower. This includes common workplaces such as restaurants, factories, and offices. While
the lender does not explicitly use any repayment incentives at the group level such as group
liability, many of the costs and benefits of default could be opaque to inexperienced borrow-
ers. These include social stigma, annoyance of collection activities, or the ease of discharging
debt. Borrowers could become more or less risky after learning from the experiences of their
coworkers.
Borrowers are first late when their monthly loan payment is not received by their due date.
Accounts delinquent for more than 90 days or 3 payment periods are in default and generally
packaged and sold to external collectors or written off. To prevent default, the lender utilizes
a variety of tools to incentivize repayment. Subsequent loans may come with more attractive
terms including lower fees and reduced APR. Additional carrots also come from higher
future loan amounts and a simpler approval process.77 Sticks include automated messages,
collection calls, penalty fees, and reporting to credit agencies. 78 Many collectors will call
family members and friends to exert additional repayment pressure. The loan officer has
no contact with the borrower after loan origination and the loan officer is not involved in
collecting delinquent loans.
77This lender was established in the last 4 years and over 98% of loans are made to first-time borrowers.
Because secondary loans may come with additional information, I restrict all of my analysis to a borrower’s
first loan.
78For especially egregious borrowers who are late on large payments, their names are published in city
newspapers and along public corridors to increase social stigma and incentivize repayment.
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3.3 Empirical strategy
The goal of the empirical section is to quantify the direct effect of a coworker defaulting
on the chance of a late payment. To solidify terms, the first step is to specify an empirical
model of default
Lateit = γLij + δDit+x
′
iΓ+ηit+ it (3.3.1)
where Lateit is an indicator for borrower i’s loan status at time t, Lij is the borrower’s
loan amount approved by loan officer j, and Dit is the total number of defaults across the
borrower’s work group at time t. The xi is a vector of borrower attributes including all of
the codified variables available to the lender and also includes fixed effects for time, city,
and industry. γ represents the borrower’s moral hazard from higher loan sizes and reflects
the increased risk induced by higher loan amounts. ηit are correlated shocks across a work
group, and it is an idiosyncratic borrower specific shock to the chance of being late. It is
without loss of generality that the unobserved component to repayment can be separated
into a portion correlated across peer groups and a borrower specific term.
δ is the causal parameter of interest, but may not be consistently estimated if the group
default characteristic Dit is correlated with the unobserved shock ηit within a peer group.
This could be the case if borrowers select peer groups based on unobserved common attributes
such as borrowers who tend to be forgetful selecting friends who are also forgetful. Borrowers
in the same coworker groups may form based on common traits, skills, and personalities.
Another concern is correlated unobservable shocks that impact the entire group at once,
which could be falsely attributed to a peer effect. These shocks could include a business
shock to everyone at a single workplace, other macroeconomic trends, or local geographic
shocks to a workplace. Borrowers may also simultaneously impact their peer group’s decision
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to default, which is known as reflection. Additionally, Lij may also be endogenous as loan
officers observe it before deciding loan sizes. Without accounting for these challenges, δ is
not identified Manski (1993).
3.3.1 Reflection
One method to address the reflection problem is to use the past actions of the group in-
stead of contemporaneous actions Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). This is accomplished
by examining the distinction between late payments and defaults. Payments are first late
as borrowers miss a payment, and are only classified as in default after being late for 3 or
more payment periods or 90 days. The reasoning is that borrowers are not able to diffuse
knowledge about the costs and benefits of collection activities, social stigma, or ease of de-
fault until the borrower actually goes through the delinquency process. After being late for
months, the borrower would have had a chance to inform his coworkers about the lender’s
collection techniques and any other associated costs. Conversely, the decision to stop re-
paying a loan could react immediately to additional knowledge. Additional specifications
increase the definition of default to 4 or 5 payment periods to examine if the peer effect
changes with time.
Other situations that may naturally have this time delay include installation of solar panels,
online purchases, or project evaluations. Another problem is that historical group actions
could still include lagged dependent actions. Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest modifying
Dit to exclude the repayment patterns of borrower i, which is only possible with individual
data. Hartmann et al. (2008) notes that by not excluding borrower i, the estimates from a
dynamic panel may be biased. This is because Dit by definition includes lagged dependent
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variables, which may affect consistency in the presence of fixed effects. In this setting,
this adjustment is automatic since borrowers are removed at default so Dit cannot include
borrower i’s past defaults. Excluding borrower i removes the influence of borrower specific
random shocks it, but this change still does not control for the correlated unobservables ηit
at the workplace level.
3.3.2 Correlated unobservables
ηi is determined by two kinds of correlated unobservables across a peer group. One is that
peer groups could form due to endogenous factors such as shared tendencies or traits, and
another is that common shocks could affect an entire group at once. The former problem is
unobservable factors that create the group while the latter is correlated shocks that affect
the group post-formation. With peer groups defined by occupation, certain industries may
attract certain types of individuals that are more likely to not repay. For example, migrant
laborers working for agricultural or manufacturing firms may find it more worthwhile to
strategically default on their loan obligations. Workers in the same company may also be
exposed to similar company shocks that decrease profitability, wages, and increase the chance
of delinquency.
My methodology to account for these factors is twofold. The first is a large collection of
over 250 borrower attributes, fixed effects for area, industry, and time to absorb geographic
and industry shocks. These attributes cover all aspects of the borrower’s financial position,
home arrangement, and workplace details. An additional robustness check on the main
specification relies on time-varying workplace controls to absorb correlated shocks. The
second approach is to use the random assignment of borrower applications to loan officers
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as exogenous variation. There are two endogenous regressors in equation (3.3.1). Dij is
endogenous because ηit is correlated across borrowers, and Lij may be endogenous because
unobserved components to repayment ηit+it are observed by loan officers before a loan size
decision. Even though the focus is on estimating Dij , Lij must also be in equation (3.3.1)
because any suitable instrument for Dij is likely to also be correlated with Lij .
The intuition for identification is that observably identical borrowers are assigned to different
loan officers with different propensities for approving loan sizes. Idiosyncratic differences
in how loan officers screen, process, and approve borrowers are assumed to be orthogonal
to each borrower’s unobserved shock it or the correlated ηit. This suggests that the loan
officer’s average approved loan amount is a strong candidate for an instrument.79 I construct
instruments following Maestas et al. (2013) who use average approval rates of disability
examiners as instruments.







where Ntj is the loan officer’s total number of cases in month t.80 The other instrument is
the average loan amount of the peer group’s loan officers in month t excluding all borrowers
in the same group
79One possible violation is if loan officers collaborate with each other. For example, a loan officer on
a particularly hard to read application may consult with others. The data does not allow me to identify
collaboration in this way, but the large workload precludes this type of joint inspection from frequently
happening.
80This allows loan officers to change their lending behavior month to month. The variation comes from








where Zitj is the set of cases excluding the peer group in month t, and NtZ is the count of
the group in month t. Both of these instruments exclude the borrower specific loan sizes. A
single peer group could have more than one loan officer. The data includes approximately
2,500 separate workplace groups with more than 1 worker. And of those, over 90% have
between 2 and 4 workers.
3.3.3 IV assumptions
Differences across loan officers lead to quasi-exogenous shocks to loan sizes and to delin-
quency. Loan officers are not involved in collecting delinquent loans which satisfies an exclu-
sion restriction. Loan collection is handled entirely by the local branch offices and external
collectors with no contact from the original loan officer. The only effect that loan officers
have on a borrower’s chance of late payment is through the choice of loan size. The instru-
ment PeerLoanij acts on workplace default through a moral hazard effect. Wang (2014a)
show that loan sizes have a direct causal effect on the probability of repayment. Borrowers
that are approved higher loan amounts become riskier all else equal. The mechanism could
be strategic default or simply that higher monthly payments causally increase the chance of
missed payments.
Table (3.13) is the first stage regression of the endogenous regressors Dit and Lij on the
exogenous variables and instruments. Despite including hundreds of controls accounting for
year by month effects, city controls, application variables, and extensive financial and inspec-
tions variables, the instruments are predictive due to idiosyncratic differences in screening,
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Table 3.13: First stage
Dependent variable: loan amount
MeanLoanitj 0.261*** 0.252*** 0.257*** 0.239*** 0.252***
(0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0403) (0.0407) (0.0398)
R2 0.369 0.415 0.435 0.477 0.520
Dependent variable: delinquent peers
PeerLoanitj 0.000376* 0.000368* 0.000368* 0.000359* 0.000336*
(0.000218)(0.000218)(0.000216)(0.000211)(0.000210)
R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.018
Number of controls 78 84 85 129 265
Year by month, city, product X X X X X
Application variables X X X X
Internal credit quality X X X
Financial variables X X
Inspection variables X
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers from December 2011 to January 2014
across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan officers. Table shows the first stage
between the loan officer’s average decision and loan sizes. MeanLoanitj is the loan officer’s
average loan amount excluding borrower i and is given by 1Nj−1
∑
−i
Lij . PeerLoanitj is the loan
officer’s average loan amount excluding borrower i’s peer group. Each peer group may have
multiple loan officers. Application variables include loan amount requested, loan purpose,
and transformations. Internal credit quality is an internal measure of borrower quality
from credit scoring. Financial variables include income, wealth, taxes, social security, credit
reports, external debt, and transformations. Inspection variables include home financing,
home living arrangement, extensive occupation details, home furnishing, tenure in workplace,
payment length dummies, and others. As of August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18. Standard errors
clustered at loan officer level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
processing, and approving borrowers. The high Z-score across specifications supports the
rank assumption that MeanLoanij has sufficient correlation with the borrower’s approved
loan amount. PeerLoanij is not as strongly correlated with the peer group’s default status.
To account for this, an additional robustness check is performed that includes time varying
workplace postal code effects.
Furthermore, it is not necessary that the assignment be entirely random. The identification
assumption is still valid as long as the borrowers are randomly assigned conditional on the
observed borrower attributes. Loan officers may specialize in borrowers from specific cities
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or time windows, but they cannot specialize in cases with particularly high or low values
of ηit + it within those categories.81 This assumption can be examined with a test for
correlated observables. The rationale is that if observable attributes are not correlated with
a loan officer’s portfolio, than it is less likely that unobservable attributes are correlated.
When examining the approval rates for disability examiners, Maestas et al. (2013) suggest
such a test. By examining the regression of Lij onMeanLoanij along with additional covari-
ates, I can test for correlated observables. This is because only borrower attributes that are
correlated withMeanLoanij should change its coefficient when added to the OLS regression.
The stable values across specifications in table (3.13) provides evidence that loan officers do
not specialize in observed borrower types beyond time and city. Extending the logic, this also
supports the assumption that loan officers do not specialize within borrower types either.
PeerLoanij also demonstrates stability in coefficients across the different specifications.
3.4 Results
Table (3.14) shows the results of the 2SLS IV estimates which show a strong relationship
between a borrower’s likelihood of delinquency and coworker defaults. The analysis only
focuses on first time borrowers since secondary loans may have different loan terms and also
include additional information unobserved to the econometrician. The main specification
is shown in column (1) with the point estimate for δ found to be .032 with the standard
errors clustered at the borrower level.82 This means that an additional default in the bor-
81Given the volume of cases, it would be difficult and impractical for a pre-screener to give the borrowers
with lower than expected ui to certain loan officers. The lender asserts that applications are not pre-sorted
beyond time and city. This is because loan officers do not all work at the same time and applications from
the same branch office may be frequently batched together. The lender does rely on separate underwriting
departments for its other products such as high net worth loans or college loans.
82Results remain significant if clustered at the loan officer or loan officer month level.
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rower’s work group increases the chance of a payment being late by 3.2%. Controlling for a
large collection of borrower attributes including industry effects, borrowers learn from their
coworkers and become riskier as their coworkers default.
This result also conforms with the estimates in the literature which find consistent evidence
that borrowers respond to the repayment patterns of their peers. Specifically, repayment or
delinquency within a peer group accentuates the behavior of its members. Breza (2013) finds
that as a borrower’s peer group moves from default to repayment, the borrower is roughly 10
to 15 percent more likely to repay. Guiso et al. (2009) find evidence that mortgage borrowers
become riskier when their peers walk away from their mortgages indicating that the spread of
information about default makes borrowers riskier. Gine et al. (2011) study a mass default of
Muslims in India and find that borrowers in groups with overall higher levels of Muslims are
riskier. In this setting, the diffusion mechanism could be more experience and information
about social stigma, ease of discharging debt, or the costs of collection efforts.
Additional specifications find that this peer effect is strengthening over time which supports
the assumption that the diffusion of information across a peer group depends on length of
experience. When a borrower is first late, he or she has not had a chance to internalize the
costs and benefits. This experience only accrues after a length of time in default subject
to bureaucracy and collection efforts. Column (2) defines the peer group default with a
month lag. Put another way, the group characteristic defines default as 4 payment periods
delinquent rather than 3, while column (3) defines default as 5 payment periods delinquent.
Borrowers that had an additional default in their work group defined this way are 3.6% more
likely to be late with their payments. This effect grows to 4.1% with a two month lag since
the coworker’s default. This suggests that borrowers respond to the information diffusion
more strongly over time although the increases are within the margin of error.
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Column (4) uses time varying fixed effects for the company’s postal code to account for
correlated shocks instead of the instrument PeerLoanij in the event that PeerLoanij is a
possible weak instrument. Time varying fixed effects for each company in the data would
be too computationally burdensome so the company postal codes are interacted with year
indicators. The alternative specification is consistent with the main results that a coworker’s
default increases the borrower’s chance of delinquency. Regression result shows that an
additional default in the borrower’s work group leads to a 2.4% higher chance of a late
payment using time varying fixed effects.
The coefficient on loan amount is also of interest. This parameter is commonly known
as the borrower’s moral hazard and represents the increased delinquency risk from higher
loan sizes. The common difficulty with identifying this parameter is that loan officers can
observe borrower attributes that the econometrician cannot so standard OLS techniques are
biased. By controlling for this endogeneity withMeanLoanij as an instrument, the estimate
indicates a strong and statistically significant causal effect. The moral hazard estimate can
be interpreted as a ¥1,000 increase in loan amounts leads to a .5% higher chance of any
payment being late.
The moral hazard estimate can be compared to the literature, although the comparison
is again not straightforward since differences in institutional setting make cross-country
comparisons difficult. Additionally, the observation unit is the monthly payment level rather
than borrower level. Despite the difficulties, the estimates are roughly consistent in sign. In
the US subprime auto financing market, Adams et al. (2009) find that a 1% increase in loan
amounts leads to a 1.6% increase in the chance of default. Other estimates find either very
small or sometimes positive magnitudes for moral hazard. Dobbie and Skiba (2013) find that
increases in loan size lead to a slight decrease in default when examining US payday lenders.
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Wang (2014a) use the same data and find a 1.5% increased chance of being delinquent at
all. The discrepancy results from allowing a single borrower to have multiple instances of
being late.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented evidence of peer effects operating through workplace groups.
I identified peer effects by exploiting rich data that allowed me to identify workplaces, see
repayment histories, and control for hundreds of borrower attributes. I overcame reflec-
tion, endogenous group formation, correlated unobservables, and endogenous loan sizes us-
ing unique institutional features of my data. By recognizing the time difference between
late loans and defaulted loans, I controlled for simultaneity of the group default variable. I
accounted for correlated unobservables and endogenous loan sizes with a natural experiment
where borrower applications were randomly assigned to loan officers. The random assign-
ment provided me with quasi-experimental variation in both loan sizes and group default
likelihood. Additionally, the methodology of using microdata to exclude the borrower’s own
delinquency from the group characteristic allowed for consistent estimation of peer effects
even in the presence of fixed effects. These techniques can be generalized to other settings
such as education or judicial sentencing.
I found consistent evidence of peer effects where an additional default by a coworker increased
the probability of a payment being late by 3.2%. This effect increased with time so that
borrowers that have a coworker delinquent for 5 payment periods are 4.1% more likely to
become late on payments. The diffusion of knowledge and experience may increase over time
as borrowers learn of the social stigma, ease of discharging debt, or the costs of collection
109
efforts. These results highlight the importance of peer effects in lending and have implications
for structuring repayment incentives such as group liability and social pressure. Furthermore,
policymakers and lenders should be concerned about possible systemic issues that may arise
when borrowers default and pass information to their peer group.
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Table 3.14: Effect of group default on delinquency
(1) (2) (3) (4)













Loan size (000’s) 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0053***
(0.00059) (0.00059) (0.00059) (0.0011)
Requested (000’s) -0.000060*** -0.000060*** -0.000060*** -0.000084***
(9.5e-06) (9.5e-06) (9.5e-06) (0.000018)
Credit score 0.000086*** 0.000087*** 0.000087*** 0.00016***
(0.000032) (0.000032) (0.000032) (0.000049)
APR (%) 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043)
Salary (000’s) -7.7e-06*** -7.7e-06*** -7.7e-06*** -0.000015***
(2.6e-06) (2.6e-06) (2.6e-06) (4.1e-06)
Credit card (1/0) -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0062***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0020)
CC utilization (%) -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0029
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0039)
Debt level (000’s) -8.8e-07** -8.8e-07** -8.8e-07** -8.2e-07**
(3.5e-07) (3.5e-07) (3.5e-07) (3.7e-07)
Manager (1/0) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0029)
Female (1/0) -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022***
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Homeowner (0/1) 0.00053 0.00053 0.00052 0.0013
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0029)
Age -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.00097***
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00016)
Observations 445,093 445,093 445,093 445,093
Time controls Year by month Year by month Year by month Year by month
Area controls City City City Postal code by
year
Notes: Data includes 31,954 first-time borrowers with 445,093 monthly payment periods
from December 2011 to January 2014 across more than 40 branches examined by 21 loan
officers. Loans are late if payment is not received within 3 days after the due date. Coworker
default 3 months defines default as 3 payment periods without payment. Default 5 mo is 5
payment periods without payment. Additional controls include year by month, city, industry,
product fixed effects, and additional application, financial, and inspection variables. As of
August 2014, $1 is ¥6.18. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.






Conditional on the hard information xi, the observed signal ωij , and the loan officer’s char-
acteristics, loan officers choose L∗ij to maximize their expected utility. Utility is given by






. rj is risk aversion, c2j is the overconfi-
dence, and σ2j is screening ability. The borrower’s repayment function is given by equation
(1.3.2).















If x is normally distributed, then
´
etxf (x)dx= etµx+ 12 t2σ2x by the moment generating func-

































































and is a decreasing function of a cost of effort
term dj . Once screening effort is chosen, a signal ωij is observed, and the optimal loan amount
is given by equation (1.3.4). Loan officers do not recognize that they are overconfident when
choosing screening effort. Solving backwards from the optimal loan amount, the indirect




. The expected utility of this function can


















































































































































































































































































Since I have no variation separating soft information σ2u from σ2 , I perform a change of
variables to transform the parameter set
(


































σ2 = σ2u+σ2 −1
The likelihood in equation (1.4.3) can be written entirely as functions of kj , σ2v , wij , σ2u+|v,
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